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version of the race game. As in the original game, subjects need to apply 
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1 Introduction 
Dynamic decisions are of importance in many areas of daily life (e.g., sequential negotiations, 
health prevention, making arrangements for retirement, or investing in education). As long as 
one can assume that there is a last period, people need to apply some form of backward 
reasoning in order to calculate their optimal decision. At the least, backward induction is a 
fundamental assumption in modeling such decisions in economics. But are people capable of 
reasoning backwards?  
Several experimental studies have reported what appear to be failures to apply backward 
induction. For example, in centipede games very few subjects play the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium strategy suggested by game theory and end the game at the first node (see 
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992, Fey et al., 1996, Nagel and Tang, 1998, Parco et al., 2002, 
Rapoport et al., 2003, Bornstein et al., 2004). As this solution depends on common knowledge 
of selfishness and rationality, explanations such as the existence of social preferences or 
limited knowledge of rationality have been proposed. In a recent field experiment with chess 
players, Levitt et al. (2011) contrast the behavior in the centipede game with that in the race 
game. In the latter game the equilibrium can also be found by backward analysis,1 but its 
game-theoretic solution is more robust than the solution of the centipede game. In the race 
game two players alternate in choosing numbers between 1 and an integer k. All chosen 
numbers are added up and the player who chooses a number that makes the sum equal to an 
integer m wins. Using this game has the advantage that the optimal strategy does not depend 
on beliefs about other players and, since it is a constant sum, winner-take-all game, it also 
does not depend on distributional or efficiency concerns. Some chess players in the study by 
Levitt et al. (2011) prove to be quite sophisticated in solving the race game with k equal to 9 
or 10 and m equal to 100. But Levitt et al. (2011) observe no systematic relationship to the 
behavior in the centipede game. They conclude that the rather late stops in the centipede game 
are not driven by the subjects’ inability to reason backwards. 
In light of this evidence, two basic observations can be made: (i) a non-negligible share of 
people appears to be able to reason backwards; (ii) in the centipede game the frequency of 
equilibrium play depends on information about the opponents.  
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 As Dufwenberg et al. (2010) and Levitt et al. (2011) point out, the race game does not require backward 
induction in a strict sense as a player does not need to solve for her opponent’s optimal choice. To acknowledge 
the different approach that is required to solve the race game, we follow Gneezy et al. (2010) and use the terms 
“backward analysis” or “backward reasoning”. 
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In this study we build on observation (i) and ask how differences in the ability to apply 
backward analysis evolve. We extend the previous research by focusing on the development 
of this capability among different age groups. In particular, using modified versions of the 
race game, we compare how these games are solved by children, adolescents, and young 
adults aged 6 to 23. Additionally, we study whether there are differences between these age 
groups regarding the improvement of their performance. Exploring the development of 
backward analysis skills is interesting in its own right. However, insights on these abilities 
may also have consequences for modeling inter-temporal decisions, which are often 
considered a game against a future self (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997, and Diamond and Köszegi, 
2003). Because many fundamental inter-temporal decisions are made early in life, for 
example planning a family or investing in education, it is important to learn how young 
people make such decisions.  
Observation (ii) underlines the importance of selecting an appropriate experimental design to 
isolate the factors that influence the application of backward analysis. Because our focus is on 
the ability to reason backwards, we follow Levitt et al. (2011) in choosing the race game as an 
experimental paradigm. Additionally, to increase comparability between age groups, we opt 
for a design in which all subjects face the same computerized opponent (that plays the 
equilibrium strategy whenever possible). 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys related literature from which we 
derive the hypotheses tested in the experiment. Section 3 presents the race games that were 
used in our study and section 4 describes the experimental design. The results are provided in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2 Related literature and hypotheses 
Our analyses are based on the race game which has been introduced to behavioral research in 
studies by Burks et al. (2009), Dufwenberg et al. (2010), and Gneezy et al. (2010). Employing 
two race games with k equal to 3 and 4 and m equal to 14 and 16, respectively, Gneezy et al. 
(2010) study whether, and how fast, subjects learn to reason backwards.2 They observe that 
subjects only seem to apply this method after experiencing defeat. Dufwenberg et al. (2010) 
focus on learning transfers across games with k equal to 2 and m equal to 6 and 21. They 
report that experience with the shorter game improves performance in the longer one, though 
subjects seem to work “this analytic solution out in steps” (p. 141). Similar to the findings by 
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 In their notation the games are called G(15, 3) and G(17, 4). 
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Gneezy et al., their results suggest that cognitive limitations prevent subjects from reasoning 
backwards right from the beginning. In fact, based on a sample of 1,000 trainee truckers, 
Burks et al. (2009) find a significantly positive relationship between performance in a race 
game (referred to as Hit 15), IQ measured by a nonverbal IQ test (Raven’s matrices), and a 
test of quantitative literacy. Similarly, conducting an online survey with 422 students, 
Carpenter et al. (2013) observe a strong correlation between performance related to Hit 15 
and two common measures for cognitive ability (i.e., Frederick’s CRT and college entrance 
exam scores from the Scholastic Achievement Test and the American College Test). The 
results by Burks et al. also reveal that the ability to solve the race game is positively related to 
patience, to the willingness to take calculated risks, and to the truckers’ perseverance on the 
job, among other things. This relationship to other economically important behavioral traits 
and behavior in the field further emphasizes the value of finding out more about the capability 
to reason backwards. 
Based on previous research on the race game, we formulate two basic hypotheses regarding 
the capability to reason backwards which we test in our experiment. First, we expect subjects 
to solve initially at least some of the race games by reasoning backwards:  
Hypothesis 1: Subjects are able to reason backwards, but to a limited degree. 
Second, because previous studies suggest that subjects learn to reason backwards when games 
are played repeatedly, we also formulate a second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The ability to reason backwards improves with repetition.  
As there is no evidence on the occurrence of this capability in children and adolescents, we 
expect the two hypotheses to hold for all age groups employed in our study. Though, there 
might be differences across these groups regarding average performance in the race game and 
its improvement. 
In recent years, the influence of age on decision-making has started to gain attention in 
economics. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies backward analysis in children 
and across age groups. Most closely related to our study is the experimental research on the 
development of rationality (which is an important assumption in many models of strategic 
decision-making) and strategic behavior with age in an economic context. Harbaugh et al. 
(2001) test whether children exhibit rational choice behavior. They find that choices of 6th 
graders (about 11 years old on average) are as consistent as choices of undergraduates (about 
21 years), while 2nd graders (about 7 years) decide inconsistently more often. Czermak et al. 
(2011) investigate the development of strategic behavior. However, they consider a smaller 
5 
age range of 10 to 17 year olds as well as static two-person games. They observe no influence 
of age on the likelihood of behaving strategically. The results of both studies suggest that 
rational behavior develops early, but does not change much thereafter.  
Related developmental research points to an age-related increase of cognitive abilities. For 
example, Schneider et al. (2008) present the results of non-verbal IQ tests applied to 10, 12, 
18, and 23 year old subjects in the Munich Longitudinal study of the Ontogenesis of 
Individual Competencies (LOGIC study).3 They find that the tested abilities increase with age 
and that this increase becomes smaller at the latter measurement points. Stern (1999) focuses 
on mathematical competencies tested in the LOGIC study.4 She reports that "for all 
mathematical tests presented at different age levels, an increase in performance level was 
obtained" (p. 161). Moreover, based on an updated data set, Stern (2008) finds significant 
gender differences in favor of males at all age levels; the effect size varies among age groups, 
however. The results of a recent meta-analysis on mathematics performance conducted by 
Lindberg et al. (2010) also point to age-related gender effects. The analysis is based on data 
from 242 studies published between 1990 and 2007 and reveals that differences between 
males and females "were negligible in elementary-school and middle-school-aged children 
and reached a peak […] in high school. The gender difference then declined for college-age 
samples and adults.” (Lindberg et al., 2010, p. 1128). In addition to their meta-analysis, 
Lindberg et al. (2010) investigate large data sets on math performance based on probability 
sampling of U.S. adolescents (i.e., the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, The National 
Educational Longitudinal Study, the Longitudinal Study of American Youth, and the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress). Consistent with their results from the meta-analysis, the 
authors observe that gender differences (favoring males) are somewhat higher in high school 
than in elementary or middle school. Lindberg et al. (2010) further report that observed 
gender differences seem to vary with the problem type (presence of multiple choice, short 
answer, and open ended questions) and the mathematical contents (proportion of algebra 
items and measurement items), however. Moreover, in a related study based on data from 
state assessment (including California, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, 
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 The nonverbal IQ tests include Cattell’s Culture Free Intelligence Test and Arlin’s Test of Formal Reasoning. 
The first test assesses fluid intelligence and requires subjects to identify and complete series of geometric 
figures, to classify and differentiate geometric figures, to complete matrix figures, and to identify proportions 
and relations of geometric areas. The second test focuses on operational reasoning, i.e. on the transition between 
concrete and formal operations. 
4
 These competencies involve word problems dealing with the comparison of sets, numerical problems that 
require using elaborated strategies, and problems dealing with proportions (see Stern, 1999).  
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New Jersey, New Mexico, West Virginia, and Wyoming), Hyde et al. (2008) observe no 
gender difference in performance at any grade level through grade 11.  
Some support for age-related gender effects has also been provided by developmental 
research testing individual planning abilities (which are related to different forms of cognitive 
flexibility; see McCormack and Atance, 2011). Among others, studies on the Tower of Hanoi 
or Tower of London tasks suggest that planning abilities gradually increase with age and 
reach a maximum at young adult age (see, e.g., Bishop et al., 2001, for the Tower of Hanoi 
task, and Unterrainer et al., 2014, for the tower of London task). In these tasks, subjects have 
to rearrange disks of different sizes or balls of different colors from one given state to a goal 
state. Subjects' challenge is to reach this goal state with the minimum number of moves while 
adhering to some predefined rules of rearrangement. Based on the Tower of Hanoi task, 
Bishop et al. (2001) provide a comparison of male and female performance for each of the 
tested age groups separately. They find gender differences favoring males only for 9 to 10 
year olds and for 11 to 12 year olds, but not for 7 to 8 year olds, 13 to 15 year olds, and 
adults. Unterrainer et al. (2014) do not report on gender effects in their test of behavior in the 
tower of London task. 
The findings from related economic experiments and developmental research suggest that the 
ability to reason backwards improves with age. Developmental research on mathematical 
performance and on the tower of Hanoi task further indicates that there are age-related gender 
effects. Gender effects are not reported in all studies and do not uniformly refer to the same 
age groups, however. Accordingly, we formulate a broader third hypothesis on the effect of 
age: 
Hypothesis 3: The ability to reason backwards improves with age, but the 
improvement differs across genders.  
3 Games 
To study the capability to reason backwards across age and gender, we employ six different 
race games G(m, k) in which two players alternate in choosing numbers between 1 and (k =) 
4. The player who chooses a number that makes the sum of all chosen numbers equal m wins. 
The six games only vary regarding m, which takes the values 19, 3, 29, 8, 11, and 21, 
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respectively. In order to identify improvement in performance (i.e. in order to test Hypothesis 
2), the six games are played twice in identical order.5 
The race game can be solved by backward analysis. In order to reach a sum equal to m in her 
last move, player 1 needs to reach m-(k+1) on her second to last move. This way player 2 has 
no chance of reaching m on his last move. To be able to reach m-(k+1) on her second to last 
move, player 1 needs to secure position m-2(k+1) on the move before. More generally, she 
has to secure position m-(n-1)(k+1) in position n where n refers to the number of her moves 
that remain. Accordingly, the first mover can win all race games except those where m is 
divisible by (k+1). This implies that our games require 0 to 5 steps of backward analysis to be 
solved and that all of them can be won by the first mover. 
4 Experimental design 
The experiment was conducted with subjects of six different age groups. Subjects were 
recruited from an elementary school (with about 340 students) and a secondary school (with 
about 1,500 students) in the town of Fröndenberg and from the University of Duisburg-Essen 
(with about 37,000 students). All institutions are located in Germany’s most populous state of 
North Rhine-Westphalia.6 
In order to make the race game understandable to subjects of all age groups, we took great 
care in simplifying its exposition. After consulting several teachers, we opted for a purely 
graphical display of the games which was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007; see the 
screenshots in Figures 1 and 2 below). In addition, we used the following framing for the 
games: Subjects were informed that they are playing several games against a computer which 
"tries to win the game". They learned that the computer has hidden a treasure (the yellow 
square, see Figure 1) in a cave, but blocked the path from the cave’s entrance to the treasure 
with stones (the red squares). The number of stones varies across games. In order to win the 
game, players have to reach the treasure by removing the stones. The subject and the 
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 As we only repeat every game once, improvements are more likely due to additional steps of reasoning rather 
than chance and reinforcement learning. The results by Gneezy et al. (2010) reveal that few subjects who have 
learned the winning strategy in G(m=14, k=3) are subsequently able to win G(m=16, k=4) on the first try. 
6
 The details of the education system in Germany vary by state. Generally, after primary school, i.e. usually after 
grade 4, children can attend four types of secondary schools: Two types that offer degrees allowing to pursue 
different paths of vocational training (Hauptschule and Realschule), one type that aims at awarding the degree 
necessary for university admission (Gymnasium), and a fourth type that offers all types of degrees 
(Gesamtschule). Fröndenberg has only one secondary school which is of the latter type. Thus, selection effects 
through educational tracking are minimized. We further check for selection effects (if there are any) by 
recruiting two age groups from each type of school (and find significant age effects also within a school type) 
and run regressions including school marks (and find a significant effect of age also when including these 
controls).  
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computer take turns in removing stones by dragging them into their respective box which 
holds up to four stones. After each turn, the stones in the box disappear. Whoever is able to 
place the treasure in his box wins the game. In all twelve games subjects are the first mover 
and, accordingly, can always reach a winning position in the first move.7 If the computer 
cannot reach a winning position, it resorts to random play. 
 
Figure 1: Graphical display of game G(m=19, k=4) 
In order to gain insight into the information subjects acquire to solve the game and to identify 
chance winnings, we initially hide the length of the game (see Johnson et al., 2002, for a 
similar procedure). That is, subjects were informed that their view of the cave is blocked by 
bushes (the green squares, see Figure 2). In order to take a stone, the bushes covering it need 
to be removed by clicking on a pair of scissors. With each click, starting from the cave’s 
entrance, two adjacent bushes disappear. During their turn subjects can remove as many 
bushes as they like. That is, subjects could remove bushes whenever they wanted during the 
game except for the time the computer made its moves. 
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 By playing against a computerized opponent, performance is comparable across all individual players (see, e.g., 
Johnson et al., 2002, McKinney and Van Huyck, 2006, Brosig and Reiß, 2007, and Burks et al., 2009, for similar 
approaches in sequential games). As the computer is programmed to win the game, it will reach the winning 
position as soon as the subject makes a wrong move. Accordingly, just imitating the moves made by the 
computer never pays off for subjects (even more so as optimal moves change with the length of the games). 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that observing the moves made by the computer after an own 
wrong move provides some help in learning to apply backward analysis. 
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Figure 2: Graphical display of game with hidden length 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects received instructions, which were read aloud and 
accompanied by a presentation and a video.8 After the presentation, five control questions 
were read aloud. Answers had to be given by dragging a ball into a “yes” or a “no” box. By 
using a similar elicitation procedure as in the games, we could also test whether subjects were 
able to handle the computer mouse (which was the case for all subjects). Having answered all 
questions correctly or having been taught the correct answers, subjects played the six race 
games Gi(m, k) twice in the identical order with m taking the values 19, 3, 29, 8, 11, and 21 
(but were left ignorant of the exact number of games to be played). The two series are 
indicated by the subscript i=1, 2. In the following we refer to the first series of the six games 
as part 1 and to the second series as part 2.  
At the end of the experiment, 6th graders, 9th graders, and all university students had to fill out 
a questionnaire asking for personal characteristics such as risk attitudes and trust behavior. 
After filling out the questionnaire, subjects were paid off and received a fixed amount of 
money for each game won. We aimed at providing similar incentives for all subjects and 
therefore varied the amount across age groups. Students earned 5 Euro per game, 9th graders 
4.40 Euro, 6th graders 2.70 Euro, 4th graders 1.80 Euro, and 1st graders 1 Euro.9 
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 All instructions and questionnaires are included in Online Appendices B and C. The video is available upon 
request. Before the first session, we tested the design with 7 children aged 8 to 13 who showed no problems in 
understanding the game. 
9
 The incentives were set after consulting the school board of the respective schools. Furthermore, we based the 
calculation on public pocket money guidelines for children in North Rhine-Westphalia, which suggest monthly 
payments of 13.00 Euro for 7 year olds, 22.00 Euro for 9 and 10 year olds, 30.90 Euro for 12 year olds, and 
48.50 Euro for 15 year olds (LWL, 2009). These guidelines are released by the union of municipalities of North 
Rhine-Westphalia and are intended, e.g., for public institutions that raise children (youth centers, etc.). As such, 
they are based on German social laws and determine how much pocket money is handed out to children and 
adolescents in those institutions. 
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In all age groups, subjects knew that their performance would be recorded anonymously (i.e., 
we used a double-blind procedure). Before the experiment, subjects received a card with a 
code name and were randomly assigned to a computer. At the end of the experiment subjects 
entered their code name and received their payment in a padded envelope marked with their 
code name from a person unaware of the amount it contained. At the schools the envelopes 
were handed out by teachers and at the university by a student assistant not involved in the 
experiment. At both schools it was necessary to collect written consent from the students’ 
parents. To preserve anonymity, teachers collected the forms and were carefully instructed to 
randomly select eligible students from their class as subjects.  
At both schools, we ran two sessions within each age group with 15 subjects each. All these 
sessions were conducted at a computer lab in the secondary school. At the university, we ran 
six sessions with a total of 55 university students. All these sessions took place at the Essen 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics (elfe). University students were recruited via Orsee 
(Greiner, 2004) such that the share of economics students among the subjects approximately 
matches the share of people from any given cohort who start studying economics in Germany. 
Our data set is summarized in Table 1. 
Group N* Female Minimum Age  Maximum Age  Institution 
Grade 1 30 67% 06 y 10 m 07 y 11 m Elementary school 
Grade 4 30 50% 09 y 10 m 11 y 08 m Elementary school 
Grade 6 30 47% 11 y 10 m 13 y 08 m Secondary school 
Grade 9 30 43% 14 y 11 m 16 y 11 m Secondary school 
University  55 51% 20 y 00 m 26 y 01 m University 
* As there is no interaction between subjects in the experiment, N denotes the number of subjects as well as the 
number of statistically independent observations. 
Table 1: Age groups 
5 Results 
For the analysis, we homogenized data sets among age groups. That is, within each age group 
we selected the largest group within a common age range of 12 months.10 This served to 
avoid potential biases in the results due to students repeating grades, for example. The 
resulting data set (including age ranges) is summarized in Table 2. In the following three 
subsections we present descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests on the three hypotheses 
derived in section 2. The fourth subsection provides further evidence from regression 
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 The threshold age between older and younger university students is set at the median age within this group. 
Data at the individual level is included in Online Appendix D. 
11 
analyses. Note that using the full sample does not alter our main results (regressions based on 
the non-homogenized data set are included in Online Appendix E and referred to in section 
5.4). 
Group N Female Minimum age  Maximum age  
Grade 1 29 66% 06 y 10 m 07 y 09 m 
Grade 4 28 50% 09 y 11 m 10 y 10 m 
Grade 6 25 44% 11 y 10 m 12 y 09 m 
Grade 9 24 38% 14 y 11 m 15 y 10 m 
University young 21 57% 20 y 00 m 20 y 10 m 
University old 19 53% 23 y 00 m 23 y 11 m 
Table 2: Restricted data set 
5.1 The ability to reason backwards 
As Hypothesis 1 relates to the initial ability to reason backwards, we focus on the first series 
of the six race games (i.e., part 1) when testing this hypothesis. Figure 3 illustrates the average 
number of games won by the different age groups in this part. On average, subjects win 1.897 
of the six games (and, not surprisingly, they are more likely to win a short game than a long 
game, see Figure 4). Although there appear to be differences between age groups (see section 
5.3), in all groups the 95-percent confidence interval for the number of games won starts at, at 
least, 1.075 games (1st graders) and ends at, at most, 2.829 games (old university students).11 
 
Figure 3: Average number of games won by age groups (with 95% confidence intervals) 
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 One possible explanation for the rather poor performance of 1st graders in part 1 might be that they are too 
young to understand the instructions. However, all except two 1st graders won the shortest game G1(m=3, k=4) 
already in part 1. Excluding these two subjects from the data set does not change any results on the performance 
qualitatively. 
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Figure 4: Share of subjects winning by game length (with 95% confidence intervals) 
One necessary (though, not sufficient) condition indicating that subjects reason backwards is 
that they uncover the length of the game (i.e., remove the bushes in order to uncover the 
treasure) before their first move. Overall, 62.3 percent of subjects always uncover the treasure 
before playing a game in part 1. This share is largely driven by the first game of this part in 
which the treasure is uncovered by 65.1 percent of subjects. The percentage of subjects 
always uncovering the treasure varies across age groups from 41.7 percent for 6th graders to 
78.9 percent for old university students. In subsequent games this share never drops below 
75.0 percent for any of the six age groups, suggesting that some learning takes place already 
within part 1. Moreover, subjects who win a game almost always uncover the treasure 
beforehand. Out of the 277 won games only 1.4 percent are won by a player who does not 
uncover the length of the game. In contrast, in 21.0 percent of the 599 lost games the length of 
the game is not uncovered before the first move. That those who do not uncover the treasure 
before their first move are more likely to lose also holds within all of the six age groups. 
Since uncovering the length of the game does not necessarily imply that subjects subsequently 
reason backwards, we also test whether those who uncovered the treasure perform 
significantly better than chance. In particular, we calculate the probability of chance winnings 
(based on the programmed computer play) for each game in part 1. Comparing observed 
frequencies of winning with the probabilities of chance winnings we find that subjects on 
aggregate perform significantly better than chance in all games except the longest game (i.e., 
game G1(m=29, k=4); p<0.001, one-tailed exact binomial tests12). This is also true when 
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differentiating between age groups (p<0.039, one-tailed exact binomial tests), except for 
young university students (who do not solve the second longest game significantly better than 
chance), old university students (who do not solve the third longest game significantly better 
than chance), and 1st graders (who only solve the two shortest games and the third longest 
game significantly better than chance; p<0.080)13. Similar results apply if the calculated 
probability is based on the additional assumption that the treasure is taken as soon as it is 
within reach, i.e. that on the last move the winning strategy is selected with probability one 
(p<0.001 for all subjects, p<0.069 for all age groups except the second longest game for 
young university students, the third longest game for 9th graders and old university students, 
and all games for 1st graders in which p>0.145; one-tailed exact binomial tests).14 
Our findings regarding Hypothesis 1 can be summarized as follows: First (and in line with 
previous results), subjects have difficulties in solving the race games. This is true for all age 
groups and particularly pronounced for 1st graders. Second, our findings on subjects’ 
information acquisition and their performance once the length of a game is known provide 
some support for the hypothesis that subjects of all age groups are able to reason backwards, 
at least to some extent (though, the evidence for 1st graders is rather weak).  
5.2 Improvement of the ability to reason backwards 
Comparing subjects’ performance between the two series of race games, we observe better 
performance in the second series for all age groups, significantly so for 1st graders, 9th graders, 
and old university students (p<0.028, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests15; see Figure 3). 
Table 3 summarizes the change in performance from part 1 to part 2. In all age groups, the 
majority of subjects wins at least as many games in part 2 as they did in part 1. As a result, the 
number of games won on average increases from 1.897 in part 1 to 2.301 in part 2. 
Performance increases (or, for a minority of subjects, decreases) on average by between one 
and two games. Of course, these increases do not capture any learning that happens within 
part 1 or part 2. 
                                                 
13
 Note that the number of 1st graders solving one of the longer games is rather low (i.e., it is never higher than 
10.3 percent). See Online Appendix F for a graphical display of the share of subjects winning by game length 
and age group. 
14
 Even if subjects are assumed to solve short games with m≤8 with certainty and play randomly otherwise, i.e. 
get the last two moves right, observed winning frequencies exceed the calculated frequencies significantly in all 
games, but G1(m=11, k=4) and G1(m=29, k=4) (p<0.074). Note, however, that under such additional assumptions 
the short games are not testable anymore as these games would be won with certainty (which is not the case 
either, see Figure 4). 
15
 We use two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests for non-parametric within-subject comparisons based on (at 
least) ordinal data. 
14 
Share of subjects (in percent) 
Grade 1  Grade 4  Grade 6  Grade 9  Uni Young  Uni Old 
+ = -  + = -  + = -  + = -  + = -  + = - 
48.3 34.5 17.2  35.7 46.4 17.9  40.0 32.0 28.0  58.3 33.3 8.3  38.1 47.6 14.3  52.6 31.6 15.8 
Table 3: Change in performance between parts 1 and 2  
Looking at each of the six games separately, we find that the share of subjects solving a game 
significantly increases for all games except G(m=8, k=4) (p<0.05, two-tailed exact McNemar 
test16; see Figure 4). The increase is particularly pronounced for G(m=11, k=4). However, 
even when we exclude this game from our analysis, we observe that 1st graders, 9th graders, 
and old university students solve (weakly) significantly more games in part 2 than in part 1 
(1st graders: p<0.050, 9th graders and old university students: p<0.100, two-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests).17 
Do the improvements in performance observed in part 2 imply that subjects are better able to 
reason backwards? We find that the share of subjects always uncovering the treasure before 
playing a game significantly increases from 62.3 percent in part 1 to 82.2 percent in part 2 
(p=0.000; two-tailed exact McNemar test). This result holds for all age groups except 1st 
graders (p<0.083, 1st graders p=0.655; two-tailed exact McNemar tests). Note that this effect 
can be mainly attributed to the rather low share of subjects always uncovering the treasure in 
the first game in part 1. When excluding this game from the analysis the increase is no longer 
significant (i.e., 78.1 percent in part 1 versus 82.2 percent in part 2; p=0.157 overall and 
p>0.157 for each of the six age groups; two-tailed exact McNemar tests). This result suggests 
that a significant part of learning to uncover the game already occurs in part 1. Nevertheless, 
when referring to the average sum of games in which a subject uncovers the treasure before 
playing this game, we observe significant improvements between the two parts also when 
excluding the first game in each of the parts (p=0.000 including, p=0.017 excluding the first 
games, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests). When testing separately for each age group, 
this result only holds for 4th graders, however (p=0.087 for 4th graders, p>0.156 for all other 
age groups when excluding the first game, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests). 
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 We use two-tailed exact McNemar tests for non-parametric within-subject comparisons based on nominal 
data. 
17
 We also run ordered probit regressions with a dependent variable indicating the change of performance 
(improved/stayed constant/deteriorated) for each of the games separately (except the longest and the shortest 
games). The results suggests that the increase in performance for game G(m=19, k=4) is particularly driven by 1st 
graders while the increase in performance for game G(m=21, k=4) is particularly driven by young and old 
university students. The regression is included in Online Appendix E.1. 
15 
Note that also in part 2 we observe that subjects who win a game almost always uncover the 
treasure beforehand. Out of the 336 won games in part 2 only 1.8 percent are won by a player 
who does not uncover the length of the game. In contrast, in 13.5 percent of the 540 lost 
games the length of the game is not uncovered before the first move. Again, also within all of 
the age groups it holds that those who do not uncover the treasure before their first move are 
more likely to lose. 
The significant increase in performance in part 2 also displays in our tests on whether those 
who uncovered the treasure perform significantly better than chance. In particular, in part 2 
subjects perform significantly better than chance in all six games (p<0.001, one-tailed exact 
binomial tests). In contrast to part 1, in the second part 1st graders also solve game G2(m=11, 
k=4) significantly better than chance, 4th graders and old university students also solve the 
longest game significantly better than chance, young university students also solve the second 
longest game significantly better than chance, and old university students also solve the third 
longest game significantly better than chance. Subjects still perform significantly better than 
chance in all six games if the calculated probability is based on the additional assumption that 
subjects take the treasure as soon as it is within reach, i.e. get the last move right (p<0.001, 
one-tailed exact binomial tests). Compared to part 1, now 1st graders also solve games 
G2(m=11, k=4) and G2(m=19, k=4) significantly better than chance, 4th graders and old 
university students also solve the longest game significantly better than chance, young 
university students also solve the second longest game significantly better than chance, and 9th 
graders and old university students also solve the third longest game significantly better than 
chance.18 
To summarize, our findings only partly support Hypothesis 2. While performance generally 
improves with repetition, it is significant for 1st graders, 9th graders, and old university 
students, only. Our analysis of subjects’ information acquisition and their performance once 
the length of a game is uncovered is in line with the interpretation that the increase in 
performance is related to an enhanced capability to reason backwards. 
We also find some indication for improvement of backward reasoning within parts when 
comparing the number of shorter games that are won after winning or losing a specific game. 
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 Note that with regard to both specifications, 4th graders no longer solve the second longest game and young 
university students no longer solve the third longest game significantly better than chance in part 2. Importantly, 
even if subjects are assumed to select the successful strategy with probability one once the treasure comes within 
reach in the next move, observed winning frequencies exceed the calculated frequencies significantly in all six 
games in part 2 (p<0.003). Under such additional assumptions the short games with m≤8 are not testable 
anymore as these games would be won with certainty (which is not the case either, see Figure 4). 
16 
The analysis focuses on games G1(m=19, k=4), G1(m=11, k=4), G1(m=21, k=4), G2(m=19, 
k=4), and G2(m=29, k=4) (the other games have to be excluded either because the number of 
winners and losers is strongly unbalanced in these or subsequent shorter games, or there is no 
shorter game afterwards). We observe that for all five games subjects who win this game 
solve more shorter games afterwards than subjects who lose this game. The difference is 
significant for games G1(m=19, k=4), G1(m=11, k=4), and G2(m=29, k=4) (p<0.071, two-
tailed Mann-Whitney-U test19). Running this test for each age group separately, we find 
similar results. Note that the latter analysis is based on game G1(m=11, k=4) only as in this 
game the number of observations for winners and losers is reasonably balanced in most age 
groups (it is still very unbalanced for 1st graders and 6th graders). We find that winners solve 
more subsequent shorter games than losers and that his difference is significant for young and 
old university students (p<0.061, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests). 
5.3 The effects of age and gender 
Looking for differences between age groups, we find that 1st graders perform significantly 
worse than all other age groups in part 1 (p<0.016, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests). 
Moreover, in part 1 both groups of university students perform weakly significantly better 
than 4th and 9th graders (0.057<p<0.089). All other differences between age groups are not 
significant (p>0.115) in this part. Our results included in the last section reveal that those 
who, in part 1, are significantly less able to solve the games than the subsequent age group 
(i.e., 1st graders and 9th graders) significantly improved their performance in part 2. As a 
result, in part 2 1st graders no longer perform significantly worse than 4th graders (p=0.124, 
two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test), but still significantly worse than all other age groups 
(p<0.052), and 9th graders no longer perform significantly worse than young university 
students (p=0.548), but still (weakly) significantly worse than old university students 
(p=0.067). 
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 We use two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests for non-parametric between-subject comparisons based on (at least) 
ordinal data. Following Dufwenberg et al. (2010) and defining the moment after which no mistakes are made 
anymore as the moment of full epiphany, we find that only a few subjects seem to reach this full epiphany in our 
experiment, however. As shown in Figure 4, the very last game G2(m=21, k=4) is solved by only 13 subjects. Of 
those, 1 subject makes the last mistake in the eleventh game G2(m=11, k=4), 6 subjects in the ninth game 
G2(m=29, k=4), 3 subjects in the seventh game G2(m=19, k=4), and 1 subject in the sixth game G1(m=21, k=4). 
One possible reason for this rather low rate of complete epiphany is that subjects in our experiment never play 
the same game twice in a row and mistakes of play are immediately punished by the computerized opponent 
playing the optimal strategy. This is also in line with a recent study of the race game conducted by Hawes et al. 
(2012). They report that subjects improve their performance incrementally rather than developing the optimal 
solution at once and support this finding by both behavioral and fMRI data. 
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Considering all age groups collectively, male subjects perform significantly better than female 
subjects in both series of games (p<0.011, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests). Differentiating 
between age groups and the two series reveals that the significant differences are restricted to 
both 4th graders and 6th graders in the second series of race games (p<0.027). Moreover, 
comparing the performance of subjects across the two parts of the experiment, we find 
significant improvements for male 4th graders and female 9th graders as well as for female old 
students (p<0.047, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests). We find weakly significant 
improvements for female 1st graders, male 9th graders, and male young students 
(0.083<p<0.098). The data is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Average number of games won by male and female subjects                                
(with 95% confidence intervals) 
These results suggest differences in the development of the capability to solve the race game 
and to reason backwards between males and females: In line with Hypothesis 3, the ability to 
reason backwards significantly improves from 1st graders to old university students for both 
genders (p<0.011, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests). Moreover, male and female subjects in 
our sample start off and end up at the same level of performance (p>0.453, two-tailed Mann-
Whitney-U tests). But males seem to acquire some skills that help to improve performance in 
the game at earlier ages than females. The main development step appears to take place 
sometime between grades 1 and 4 for males and sometime between grades 6 and 9 for 
females.  
Our findings are similar to the ones obtained in the study on the development of planning 
behavior conducted by Bishop et al. (2001). Also with respect to Tower of Hanoi tasks 
gender-related performance differences are restricted to 9 to 12 year olds (see section 2). 
Moreover, we re-investigate data obtained by Harbaugh et al. (2001), which focuses on 
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rational choice behavior, but does not present evidence on gender effects. Our analysis reveals 
similar age-related differences between males and females in their study. In particular, we 
find that there are no significant gender differences in the number of inconsistent decisions for 
2nd graders and university students (p>0.500, two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests), but that male 
6th graders decide more consistently than their female peers (p=0.020).  
5.4  Further analyses 
Next to age and gender we collected further information about the individuals participating in 
our study. In order to control for potentially confounding influences, we additionally estimate 
several regression models that include this information. We conduct three analyses using 
different dependent variables: We analyze (i) the number of games won within part 1 and 
within part 2, (ii) the difference in number of games won between part 1 and part 2, and (iii) 
the number of correctly identified winning positions during the play of the games within part 
1 and within part 2. We conduct these analyses also for the full data set without homogenizing 
age groups as well as for both data sets (with and without homogenized age groups) excluding 
the shortest game G(m=3, k=4). The results of these robustness checks are included in 
Appendices E.2 to E.8 and are referred to in this section.  
In analysis (i) we present OLS-regressions using the number of games won by a subject as 
dependent variable separately for both parts. Specification (1) includes dummy variables for 
grades, for gender, and for whether the subject uncovered the treasure before the very first 
move in the first of the 12 games played in total. Specification (2) additionally includes 
school marks received in math and in German. It is based on a data set that excludes all 1st 
graders, since they do not receive marks yet. Specification (3) additionally includes data from 
our ex-post questionnaire, i.e. data on a subject’s patience, trust, fairness, and risk 
preferences. The data were elicited through questions similar to those employed in the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (a detailed description of variables is included in Appendix 
A). Since questionnaires were not completed by 1st graders and 4th graders, the data set for the 
third specification is restricted to 6th graders, 9th graders, and university students. In all 
regressions 6th graders serve as the baseline category. The results of the regressions are 
displayed in Tables 4 and 5.20 
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 Through the grade dummies our specifications capture non-linear age effects that are likely to occur especially 
between school students and university students due to selection. The variable ‘uncover treasure’ is included as a 
control for the initial understanding of the game. After the first game, the uncovering behavior does not exhibit 
much variation. For pupils the marks for German and math were obtained from the school directly, while 
university students were asked about their last marks in the questionnaire. After consulting teachers at both 
schools grades were aligned to a common scale from 1 (poor) to 15 (very good). Furthermore, as no participant 
wins every game or no game at all, censoring does not need to be taken into account. 
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The three regression specifications are run separately for the two parts of the experiment and 
support our previous interpretation of the data. Uncovering the location of the treasure before 
the very first move positively influences the number of games won in both parts, while being 
female has a (weakly) significantly negative effect on performance in 4th and 6th grade in part 
2. When excluding the shortest game G1(m=3, k=4) we additionally observe a weakly 
significantly negative gender effect for female old university students in part 1 for 
specifications (1) and (2). Without homogenizing age groups there is also a (weakly) 
significantly negative effect of being female for 9th graders across the three specifications. 
These differences disappear in part 2 (see the Online Appendices E.2 and E.3). 
 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -0.966*** (0.331)     
Grade 4 -0.071 (0.300) -0.130 (0.313)   
Grade 9 -0.058 (0.296) -0.026 (0.309) -0.040 (0.322) 
Uni young 0.184 (0.341) 0.107 (0.357) 0.088 (0.392) 
Uni old 0.459 (0.340) 0.431 (0.355) 0.395 (0.389) 
Grade 1 x female 0.092 (0.312)     
Grade 4 x female -0.426 (0.301) -0.277 (0.319)   
Grade 6 x female -0.234 (0.321) -0.133 (0.344) -0.114 (0.364) 
Grade 9 x female -0.492 (0.335) -0.461 (0.349) -0.512 (0.366) 
Uni young x female -0.048 (0.353) -0.049 (0.370) -0.035 (0.399) 
Uni old x female -0.577 (0.365) -0.607 (0.385) -0.589 (0.418) 
Uncover treasure  0.480*** (0.146) 0.529*** (0.170) 0.510** (0.202) 
Mark German   -0.020 (0.042) -0.018 (0.049) 
Mark math   0.098*** (0.034) 0.102** (0.040) 
Fairness     -0.118 (0.224) 
Patience     -0.018 (0.040) 
Risk     0.151 (0.173) 
Trust     0.004 (0.046) 
Constant 1.835*** (0.232) 1.070** (0.489) 0.761 (0.882) 
Adj. R-squared 0.209 0.152 0.106 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 4: Regressions on the number of games won in part 1 
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 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -0.932** (0.404)     
Grade 4 -0.071 (0.367) -0.125 (0.377)   
Grade 9 -0.248 (0.362) -0.213 (0.372) -0.225 (0.405) 
Uni young 0.049 (0.417) -0.027 (0.431) 0.006 (0.494) 
Uni old 0.532 (0.415) 0.505 (0.428) 0.499 (0.491) 
Grade 1 x female -0.075 (0.382)     
Grade 4 x female -1.050*** (0.368) -0.917** (0.384)   
Grade 6 x female -0.850** (0.392) -0.850** (0.414) -0.860* (0.459) 
Grade 9 x female 0.269 (0.41) 0.300 (0.421) 0.165 (0.462) 
Uni young x female -0.171 (0.431) -0.160 (0.446) -0.113 (0.503) 
Uni old x female -0.130 (0.446) -0.153 (0.464) -0.128 (0.527) 
Uncover treasure  0.349* (0.179) 0.425** (0.204) 0.463* (0.255) 
Mark German   -0.021 (0.050) -0.016 (0.062) 
Mark math 
 
 0.090** (0.041) 0.093* (0.050) 
Fairness     -0.276 (0.282) 
Patience     -0.004 (0.050) 
Risk     0.419 (0.218) 
Trust     0.023* (0.058) 
Constant 2.419*** (0.284) 1.727*** (0.589) 0.542 (1.111) 
Adj. R-squared 0.200 0.178 0.097 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 5: Regressions on the number of games won in part 2 
Controlling for school marks in specification (2) we additionally find that subjects who are 
better in math are also more capable of solving the games and, accordingly, win more games 
in the two parts. The inclusion of subjects’ answers to the ex-post questionnaire in 
specification (3) reveals a weakly significantly positive relationship between trust and a 
subject’s ability to solve the games in part 2. The effects of the mark in math and self-reported 
trust are robust to the choice of the data set. Also when pooling observations from part 1 and 
part 2 we observe similar effects of the mark in math and of self-reported trust (see Table 
E.4.1 in the Online Appendix E.4). This somewhat surprising result is in line with previous 
research by Burks et al. (2009) who find a positive correlation between trust and IQ. Neither 
risk attitudes nor fairness preferences appear to be related to the number of games won. 
Applying ordered probit regressions instead of OLS yields similar results for part 1, part 2, 
and when pooling both parts (see Tables E.2.2, E.3.2, and E.4.2 in the respective Online 
Appendices). 
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Applying Wald tests on regression specification (1) yields more insights about gender-
specific age differences. The results support our conclusions drawn in the previous section 
and are in line with Hypothesis 3: Performance improves with age and males seem to acquire 
some skills that help to win the game at earlier ages than females. In particular, male 1st 
graders win (weakly) significantly less often than males of all older age groups in both parts 
(p<0.036 for nine out of ten, p=0.092 for one comparison), while there is almost no 
significant difference between the older age groups (p>0.120 for 19 out of 20, p=0.061 for 
one comparison). In contrast, in both parts the performance of females is almost never 
significantly different between 1st, 4th, and 6th graders (p>0.180 for five out of six, p=0.036 for 
one comparison), but females of these three younger age groups win (weakly) significantly 
less often than females of the three older age groups (p<0.049 for eleven out of eighteen, 
p=0.075 for one, p>0.250 for six comparisons). Again, between the three older age groups 
there is almost no significant difference regarding the performance (p<0.210 for five out of 
six, p=0.053 for one comparison).   
After analyzing the performance within the two parts we now turn to the differences in 
performance between part 1 and part 2 and their relationship with age and gender. Analysis 
(ii) which includes the difference in number of games won between part 1 and part 2 as a 
dependent variable provides some insights into this relationship. In this analysis we use the 
same independent variables as above yielding three similar specifications. The results of the 
respective OLS-regressions are presented in Table 6. Ordered probit regressions produce 
similar results (see Table E.5.2 in the Online Appendix E.5). 
For specifications (1) and (2) it shows that performance of female 4th graders improves 
weakly significantly less than performance of male 4th graders while performance of female 
9th graders improves weakly significantly more than performance of male 9th graders. This 
observation on relative performance increases extends the results on improvement in section 
5.3 for these age groups. However, the effect for male 9th graders turns insignificant after 
including additional controls in specification (3). Wald tests comparing the improvement of 
performance between different age groups for the same gender using specification (1) reveal 
no significant differences for males. Yet, they reveal that the performance of female 9th 
graders and that of female old university students increases significantly more than that of 
female 4th and 6th graders (p<0.010). It also increases weakly significantly more than that of 
female 1st graders and female young university students (p<0.100).   
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 OLS - dependent variable:  
difference in number of games won between part 1 and part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.034 (0.407)     
Grade 4 0.000 (0.369) 0.006 (0.378)   
Grade 9 -0.190 (0.364) -0.188 (0.373) -0.185 (0.417) 
Uni young -0.134 (0.419) -0.133 (0.432) -0.081 (0.509) 
Uni old 0.073 (0.418) 0.074 (0.429) 0.104 (0.505) 
Grade 1 x female -0.167 (0.384)     
Grade 4 x female -0.624* (0.370) -0.641* (0.385)   
Grade 6 x female -0.616 (0.395) -0.717* (0.415) -0.746 (0.473) 
Grade 9 x female 0.760* (0.412) 0.761* (0.422) 0.678 (0.475) 
Uni young x female -0.123 (0.434) -0.112 (0.447) -0.078 (0.518) 
Uni old x female 0.447 (0.449) 0.453 (0.465) 0.460 (0.542) 
Uncover treasure  -0.131 (0.180) -0.104 (0.205) -0.047 (0.262) 
Mark German   -0.001 (0.050) 0.002 (0.064) 
Mark math   -0.009 (0.041) -0.009 (0.052) 
Fairness     -0.158 (0.291) 
Patience     0.014 (0.052) 
Risk     0.019 (0.059) 
Trust     0.268 (0.225) 
Constant 0.584** (0.285) 0.657 (0.591) -0.219 (1.144) 
Adj. R-squared 0.035 0.042 -0.026 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 6: Regressions on improvement between part 1 and part 2 
In analysis (iii) we additionally conduct a more fine-grained investigation based on each of 
the moves the subjects made in the experiment. The dependent variable in this analysis is the 
number of correctly identified winning positions during the play of the games. A game G(m, 
k) is made up of m positions of which a subset are winning positions. Each move a subject 
makes in the experiment can lead to a winning or a losing position. A winning position can be 
characterized by the distance to the treasure n. More precisely, n indicates how many correct 
moves are necessary to reach the treasure from this point in the game (cf. section 3). The 
following analysis considers whether a subject has uncovered the treasure on a move-by-
move basis. That means, we only count a move as “correct” if it was made after uncovering 
the treasure and if it resulted in a winning position. Moves to a winning position that were 
made by luck, i.e. without knowing the position of the treasure, are considered to be wrong as 
they cannot be regarded as evidence for any sort of backward analysis.  
Figure 6 shows the error rates over the positions n across grades and gender aggregated over 
part 1 and part 2. These error rates are calculated conditional on reaching the respective 
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position. Note that the number of observations available for calculating the error rates 
decreases with n. The longest game G(m=29, k=4) potentially provides us with observations 
for n=6 to n=1 while the shortest game G(m=3, k=4) only yields one observation in n=1. The 
figure reveals, not surprisingly, that error rates roughly increase with the distance from the 
treasure. However, it mainly highlights the gender differences already suggested by the 
regressions above as well as by the tests in the previous section. There is a pronounced 
difference in 4th and 6th grade: In these age groups female participants never have a lower 
error rate than their male peers. In all other age groups the difference in error rates is smaller 
and female players exceed the performance of males in at least one of the positions n. 
 
Figure 6: Error rates conditional on reaching position n 
In most age groups there is a drop in error rates in n=6. This effect is driven only by the 
longest game, namely G(m=29, k=4). The winning strategy in this game requires subjects to 
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take four stones in the first move. This move coincides with the commonly observed behavior 
to “shorten” the game as much as possible. In part 1, 58 percent of the subjects make a correct 
move in n=6 by taking four stones, but none of these subjects is able to find the next winning 
position in n=5 that requires them to take three stones. In part 2, 44 percent make the correct 
move in n=6. 19 percent of them also find the next winning position in n=5. Overall only four 
subjects win this game. 
 
Analyzing the performance depending on the position of the game more formally, we assume 
that each subject plans his or her action prior to every move i in some way that depends on n. 
Each move made by subject i is characterized by δi indicating whether it leads to a winning 
position (δi=1) or a losing position (δi=0). The ability to make a correct move is determined 
by the positive random variable T that can be thought of as the number of correctly identified 
winning positions in the remaining game or the successful steps of backward reasoning. As 
long as a draw t of T is larger or equal to n, the move will be correct and the subsequent 
winning position will be reached. For simplicity, we assume T to be continuous and having a 
conditional density f(t|x,θ) where x is a vector of subject specific covariates and θ is a 
parameter vector. Then, building on the techniques of survival analysis, we refer to the 
cumulative distribution function of T as F(t|x,θ)=Pr(T<t|x,θ) and to the complementing 
survival function as S(t|x,θ)=Pr(T≥t|x,θ)=1-F(t|x,θ) (see, e.g., Klein and Moeschberger, 2003).  
In the experiment we never observe the draws t directly. Instead our observations are 
censored. If we observe a wrong move in position n, we only know that an error of reasoning 
was made, but we do not learn the realization of t, i.e. 0 < t < n. If we observe a correct move 
in n then we know that no error occurred in n or before. However, we do not know how many 
correct moves could have followed, i.e. n ≤ t. This yields a likelihood function 
L(θ) = ∏i S(ti|x,θ)δ (1-S(ti|x,θ))1-δ 
over all moves i. In order to maximize this likelihood function, however, some assumption 
over the distribution of T has to be made. We selected the generalized gamma distribution 
from a set of commonly used distributions based on the Bayesian information criterion.21  
                                                 
21
 We also considered the exponential, the Weibull, the Gompertz, the log-normal, the log-logistic, the inverse 
Gaussian and the gamma distribution (see Tables E.6.1 and E.7.1 in the respective Online Appendices). 
Regressions were performed with Stata’s user-written command “intcens” for interval censored data (Griffin, 
2005). In addition, we considered two alternative approaches that yielded similar results: First, the method 
introduced by Royston and Parmar (2002) that models the baseline cumulative hazard function of a proportional 
hazards model as a cubic spline. Second, a Cox proportional hazards model with right-censoring and midpoint 
imputation. Regressions based on the former approach are included in Tables E.6.4 and E.7.4 of the respective 
Online Appendices. Regressions based on the latter approach are included in Tables E.6.5 and E.7.5. 
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We run three different models with the independent variables also used in analyses (i) and (ii) 
above. We report the exponentiated coefficients of the accelerated failure time models in 
Tables 7 and 8.  
 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.841 (0.146)     
Grade 4 0.988 (0.14) 0.947 (0.145)   
Grade 9 0.884 (0.142) 0.848 (0.145) 0.871 (0.149) 
Uni young 1.306 (0.283) 1.214 (0.242) 1.255 (0.302) 
Uni old 1.399* (0.272) 1.308 (0.251) 1.369 (0.341) 
Grade 1 x female 0.845 (0.102)     
Grade 4 x female 0.863 (0.140) 0.881 (0.148)   
Grade 6 x female 0.862 (0.146) 0.922 (0.153) 0.957 (0.206) 
Grade 9 x female 0.798 (0.157) 0.805 (0.155) 0.808 (0.154) 
Uni young x female 0.863 (0.158) 0.884 (0.151) 0.901 (0.162) 
Uni old x female 0.731** (0.109) 0.762* (0.118) 0.740* (0.121) 
Mark German   0.985 (0.018) 0.992 (0.020) 
Mark math   1.028 (0.020) 1.024 (0.020) 
Fairness     0.974 (0.089) 
Patience     0.994 (0.017) 
Risk     0.996 (0.020) 
Trust     1.082 (0.081) 
Constant 1.457* (0.31) 1.441 (0.340) 1.099 (0.529) 
Log pseudolikelihood -694.365 -551.088 -414.951 
Number of moves 1,317 1,073 821 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 7: Regressions on correctly identified winning positions in part 1 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.719* (0.132)     
Grade 4 0.999 (0.137) 0.997 (0.128)   
Grade 9 0.835 (0.147) 0.855 (0.151) 0.860 (0.138) 
Uni young 1.090 (0.201) 1.071 (0.183) 1.078 (0.179) 
Uni old 1.292 (0.262) 1.285 (0.264) 1.273 (0.259) 
Grade 1 x female 0.851 (0.162)     
Grade 4 x female 0.643*** (0.082) 0.670*** (0.082)   
Grade 6 x female 0.645*** (0.096) 0.650*** (0.096) 0.657*** (0.093) 
Grade 9 x female 1.008 (0.191) 1.022 (0.185) 0.935 (0.157) 
Uni young x female 0.897 (0.160) 0.894 (0.147) 0.933 (0.148) 
Uni old x female 0.807 (0.220) 0.856 (0.207) 0.950 (0.212) 
Mark German   0.996 (0.021) 0.994 (0.023) 
Mark math   1.026 (0.019) 1.026 (0.020) 
Fairness     0.917 (0.092) 
Patience     1.006 (0.020) 
Risk     1.026 (0.020) 
Trust     1.180** (0.090) 
Constant 2.317*** (0.305) 2.090*** (0.569) 1.291 (0.545) 
Log pseudolikelihood -694.324 -521.716 -389.235 
Number of moves 1,424 1,136 880 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 8: Regressions on correctly identified winning positions in part 2 
The regressions reveal no or only weakly significant differences in performance during part 1. 
Old female university students perform slightly worse than their male counterparts (p≤0.080) 
across specifications. Old university students tend to perform somewhat better than 6th graders 
as long as we do not control for grades or fairness, patience, risk, or trust attitudes (p=0.085). 
The gender differences described above appear to be mainly driven by the performance in the 
second part. In this part, female 4th and 6th graders perform significantly worse than their male 
class mates: in 4th grade the distance from the treasure in which females successfully solve the 
game is on average 35.8 percent smaller than that of males (p≤0.001); in 6th grade it is 35.5 
percent smaller (p≤0.004).22 This significant effect is robust across specifications and 
provides further evidence for gender-specific age effects as formulated in Hypothesis 3. We 
also find a significant increase of performance associated with larger trust (p=0.030) and a 
weakly significantly worse performance of 1st graders (p=0.072).  
                                                 
22
 In this case, e.g., the effects from the exponentiated coefficients are calculated as follows: (0.999-1+0.643–1)* 
100 =-35.8 and (0.645-1)*100=-35.5. 
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An analysis that counts moves as correct that were made to winning positions even though the 
treasure was not visible is included in Tables E.6.3 and E.7.3 of the Online Appendices E.6 
and E.7. Under this assumption old university students perform significantly better than 6th 
graders across specifications in part 1. In part 2, the disadvantage female 6th graders have 
relative to their male classmates turns weakly significant across specifications. Similar to 
analysis (i), the gender effects in part 1 depend somewhat on the choice of the data set. When 
using the unhomogenized data set and counting only moves as correct that were made after 
uncovering the treasure, the disadvantage of female old university students turns significant. 
Furthermore, when excluding the shortest game G(m=3, k=4), we already find a significantly 
negative effect of being female for 6th graders (see the Online Appendix E.6). 
When pooling observations from part 1 and part 2 in an additional regression we observe 
similar effects as when considering part 2 alone (see Table E.8.2 in Online Appendix E.8). In 
this regression we can also include a dummy variable for the observations from part 2. This 
variable is significant across specifications and indicates an increase of performance of 
around 20.0 percent due to the repetition supporting Hypothesis 2 (p<0.001). 
6 Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which sheds light on the development of 
the capability to reason backwards in children, adolescents, and young adults. We develop a 
graphical variant of the race game that is suitable for testing this ability already at an age of 6 
years up to an age of 23 years. Behavior is considered in two identical series of race games 
that allow us to observe improvements of performance. Our findings confirm previous 
research insofar as, on average, subjects have difficulties conducting backward analyses. But 
the results presented here reveal that these difficulties diminish with age. In particular, 
subjects are able to learn how to solve a race game. Differentiating between genders we find 
significant differences not only regarding the ability to analyze backwards in the first place, 
but also with respect to learning this ability. While there are no gender differences up to the 
4th grade, male 4th graders significantly improve in solving the race game. Accordingly, we 
find some evidence for performance differences between males and females among 4th 
graders attending elementary school and among 6th graders attending secondary school. Since 
there are no differences between males and females among 9th graders (and university 
students), it seems that females catch up to males after the 6th grade.  
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Although we took different measures to avoid selection problems (see also footnote 6), the 
results reported should be taken with some care. As our study is not based on longitudinal 
data, we cannot exclude the possibility that the results are somehow biased due to selection 
effects through educational tracking or that the reported effects are cohort effects, not age 
effects. However, we find some supportive evidence for our observed gender-specific path of 
development in the data obtained by Harbaugh et al. (2001) who test whether children make 
rational choices about consumption goods, but do not check for gender differences. Also the 
results provided by Bishop et al. (2001) who test planning abilities in Tower of Hanoi tasks 
are in line with our age-related gender effects. In addition, age-related gender effects are 
found in a meta-study on mathematics performance (Lindberg et al., 2010). The reported 
gender effects seem to be specifically pronounced in high school, though. Note that our 
results are not at odds with observations made by Czermak et al. (2011) in static two-person 
games, who find no relationship between age and the level of strategic sophistication. As they 
study the behavior of 5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th graders the differences can be attributed to the 
different age ranges under consideration.  
In general, developmental research has offered several explanations for the differences 
between males and females observed in cognitive tasks. While some interpretations refer to 
biological causes like innate brain differences or hormonal influences, other explanations are 
based on environmental causes like socialization practices or stereotypes (for an overview 
see, e.g., Miller and Halpern, 2014). As both, biological and environmental factors, interact 
with each other, in recent years an increasing number of studies rely on a broader integrative 
approach that tries to take into account this interaction. Until now the origin of gender 
differences in cognitive abilities is still highly debated, however (see, e.g., Guiso et al., 2008). 
Biological as well as environmental factors may have caused the age-related gender 
differences observed in our study. For example, there is some developmental research on 
planning abilities linking performance in the Tower of London task (in which there appear to 
be age-related gender effects similar to that observed in our study) to the maturation of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Kaller et al., 2012). As there is some evidence for gender 
differences in brain maturation, age-specific gender effects in planning ability (and possibly 
in the capability to reason backwards) might be related to the differences in maturational 
trajectories for males and females (see, e.g., the discussion in Unterrainer et al., 2013). Instead 
or in addition, the age-related different performance of males and females might result from 
different mathematical ability estimates parents and teachers give to the two genders (e.g., 
Hyde et al., 2008) and their age-related influence on behavior. Although our games are not 
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framed as specific math tasks, such estimates might still have affected performance in our 
study.  
Finally, we cannot exclude the possibility that the weight subjects give to winning a game or 
the familiarity with similar strategic situations vary with age and across gender. As such, our 
study provides first evidence for the development of the capability to reason backwards. 
However, more research is needed to isolate the factors that drive this development. 
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Appendix A:  Description of variables 
Variable Description 
ID Unique subject number 
Age (months) Age in months 
Grade 1 Is subject from grade 1 (restricted sample), 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Grade 4 Is subject from grade 4 (restricted sample), 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Grade 6 Is subject from grade 6 (restricted sample), 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Grade 9 Is subject from grade 9 (restricted sample), 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Student (young) Is subject a “young” university student (restricted sample), 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Student (old) Is subject an “old” university student (restricted sample), 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Grade (12) Grade when the sample is restricted to a maximum age range of 12 months 
at every level, 1 = grade 1, 4 = grade 4, 6 = grade 6, 9 = grade 9, 14 = 
young university student, 15 = old university student 
Grade (full) Grade without sample restriction, 1 = grade 1, 4 = grade 4, 6 = grade 6, 9 = 
grade 9, 14 = young university student, 15 = old university student 
Female  Gender, 1 = female, 0 = male 
Uncover treasure  Did the subject uncover the treasure before the very first move in game 1? 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
Mark German School mark in German on a scale from 1 = very poor to 15 = very good 
(for university students the last school mark is used) 
Mark math School mark in math on a scale from 1 = very poor to 15 = very good (for 
university students the last school mark is used) 
Fairness Reply to the question ‘Do you think most people…’ on a scale from 0 = 
‘… would exploit you if they were given the chance’ to 1 = ‘… would try 
to treat you in a fair way’. 
Part 2 Is the analyzed move in part 2 of the experiment, 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Patience Reply to the question ‘How do you see yourself: Are you normally an 
impatient person or do you usually exercise patience?’ on a scale from 0 = 
‘very impatient’ to 10 = ‘very patient’. 
Risk Reply to the question ‘How do you see yourself: Do you normally 
take risks or try to avoid them?’ on a scale from 0 = ‘do not take 
risks at all’ to 10 = ‘take a lot of risks’. 
Trust Reply to the question ‘What is your opinion on the following statement: In 
general, one can trust people’ on a scale from 1 = ‘fully disagree’ to 4 = 
‘fully agree’. 
Wins (1) Number of games a subject wins in part 1 
Wins (2) Number of games a subject wins in part 2 
Table A: Description of variables 
 
  
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
Online Appendix B: Instructions (translated from German)
Hello and welcome! Today you are taking part in an experiment in which you will be able to 
earn money. How much money you will earn depends on your decisions. 
 
Important: All your decisions are made anonymously. Nobody will be able to link the choices 
you made to your name. We will tell you in a moment what the experiment is about. First of 
all there are two important rules: 
 
 
1. Signal us, if you do not understand something. We want you to have a perfect 
understanding of everything!
 
 
2. It is not allowed to talk to other participants. If you, however, talk to another 
participant you will be immediately excluded from this experiment. Consequently you 
will also earn no money in this case.
 
Now let’s return to the rules of the game. Several times each of you 
game against the computer. The more often you win against the computer, the more money 
you will earn. How does the game look like?
 
The computer challenges you. The goal of the game is to reach and collect a treasure. 
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will individually play a 
 
 
 The treasure, which looks like a yellow square, has been buried by the computer in a cave, 
which has only one entry. You and the computer can reach the treasure only by using the 
entrance of the cave.  
 
 
Unfortunately, the computer has blocked the passage from t
or more red stones. (This means that behind the treasure there are no more red stones but only 
air.) To reach the treasure you have to remove the red stones. The stones can only be removed 
by carrying them out through the 
can only move the stone, which is the closest to the entrance. 
 
 
You can remove the stones by packing them into your box. This box (the blue rectangle on 
the left side) only fits one, two, three
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he entry to the treasure with one 
entrance of the cave. This means that you and the computer 
 
 
, or at most four stones.  
  
By removing the stones you alternate with your rival, the computer.
 
 
The computer can also remove stones and also has a box (the blue rectangle on the right side) 
that fits four stones at most.  
 
 
After every move the stones in your box and the computer’s box disappear. The winner is the 
player who packs the treasure in his box first. In this game you are always the first who can 
pack stones into your box and remove them. Thereafter, it is the computer’s turn. Same as 
you, the computer tries to win the game and to put the treasure into his box.
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You can pick a stone by clicking on it with the mouse, holding the button and pulling the 
stone into your box. (If you have put more stones in your box than you wanted to, you ca
pull the stones back into the cave.) When there are as many stones in your box as you want to 
remove, you have to click on the blue checkmark button and the stones disappear. Then it is 
the computer’s turn and you can observe how many stones the computer
  
 
You take turns with the computer until one of you removes the treasure and wins. You can 
only win by packing the stone into your box and removing it. Same as you, the computer must 
remove at least one stone at each turn.
 
 
There is a special feature: After the computer has hidden the treasure it has blocked your view 
to the cave with bushes, that look like green squares. The computer knows what is hidden 
behind each green bush. If you want to see what is behind the green bushes as well, you
have to click on the hedge trimmer.
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n 
 
 just 
 Starting from the entry of the cave you can remove two adjacent bushes by clicking on the 
hedge trimmer once.  
 
 
In each move you can remove as many green bushes as you want. Behind every green bush 
there can be either a red stone, or nothing, or the treasure. As mentioned before, you play 
several games consecutively. These games differ from each other only in the number of red 
stones, blocking your way to the treasure. For each game you win you will receive 5
depending on age group] Euro.
 
When you entered this room you received a card with your code name. Please keep it safe. At 
the end of the experiment you have to enter your code name in the computer. You also need 
your card to collect your payoff.
 
At the end of the experiment your respective payoffs will be calculated. After this the cash 
desk in the corridor outside the laboratory opens. There you can collect a closed envelope 
containing your payoff by showing your card. The cashier does not know 
envelopes. Please collect your payoffs immediately after the experiment. [Payoff description 
of the instructions for university students.]
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what is inside these 
 
 [amount 
Before we start we will ask some questions so that we can help you better to understand the 
game. 
  
 
Please answer the questions with “Yes” or “No” by pulling the blue ball, which will appear in 
front of you on the monitor, into the green or the red area.
 
 
1) Please have a look at the following game. Does the computer know behind which 
green bush the treasure lies?
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 2) Please have a look at the following game. Do you see where the treasure is?
 
 
3) Please have a look at the following game. Are you allowed to remove all green bushes 
with the hedge trimmer now?
 
 
4) Please have a look at the 
the game? 
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following game. Is it correct, that the computer is winning 
 
 5) Please have a look at the following game. You want to pack two stones into your box 
in order to win. Is this possible?
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
Online Appendix C: Ex-post questionnaire (translated from German) 
We would be very pleased if you could take a few minutes to answer some questions. You 
can start the questionnaire by clicking “continue”. As soon as every participant completed the 
questionnaire, participants are paid off one by one. 
 
1. How did you make your decisions? Please explain briefly. 
 
2. How do you see yourself: Do you normally take risks or try to avoid them? 
Do not take risks at all           Take a lot of risks 
 
3. How do you see yourself: Are you normally an impatient person or do you usually 
exercise patience? 
Very impatient           Very patient 
 
4. What is your opinion on the following statement: In general, one can trust people. 
  Fully agree 
  Rather agree 
  Rather disagree 
  Fully disagree 
 
5. Do you think most people... 
  … would exploit you if they were given the chance? 
  … would try to treat you in a fair way? 
 
6. Please think back to your school days: Which mark did you reach in math on your last 
school report? What kind of course did you take part in? 
Math 
  1 – very good (13 – 15 points) 
  2 – good (10 – 12 points) 
  3 – satisfactory (7 – 9 points) 
  4 – sufficient (4 – 6 points) 
  5 – unsatisfactory (1 – 3 points) 
  6 – very poor (0 points) 
 Course 
  Basic course 
  Advanced course 
  Other course 
  Do not know 
If you indicated “other course”: How was this course named? 
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7. Please think back to your school days: Which mark did you reach in German on your 
last school report? What kind of course did you take part in? 
German 
  1 – very good (13 – 15 points) 
  2 – good (10 – 12 points) 
  3 – satisfactory (7 – 9 points) 
  4 – sufficient (4 – 6 points) 
  5 – unsatisfactory (1 – 3 points) 
  6 – very poor (0 points) 
 Course 
  Basic course 
  Advanced course 
  Other course 
  Do not know 
If you indicated “other course”: How was this course named? 
 
8. Please specify your gender:   
 Male  
 Female 
 
9. Please indicate your year and month of birth: 
Year:   
Month (1 – 12): 
 
10. Which is your field of study (field and degree)? 
 
11. In which semester are you in this field of study? 
 
This was the last page of the questionnaire. Thank you very much! 
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Online Appendix D: Data 
ID Age 
(months) 
Grade 
(12) 
Grade 
(full) 
Female Wins 
(I) 
Wins 
(II) 
Mark 
math 
Mark 
German 
Risk Patience Trust Fair Uncover 
(1st game) 
1 247 14 14 1 2 3 10 13 7 2 2 0 1 
2 308  15 1 3 4 13 13 1 8 2 0 1 
3 240 14 14 1 2 3 13 12 7 6 3 0 0 
4 262  14 0 3 3 6 12 8 9 2 0 1 
5 250 14 14 0 2 2 10 13 6 5 3 1 1 
6 293  15 1 1 2 12 12 2 4 2 0 0 
7 249 14 14 1 3 3 8 12 1 2 2 0 1 
8 290  15 1 2 3 8 14 2 9 2 0 0 
9 313  15 1 3 3 8 10 8 5 3 1 1 
10 249 14 14 0 3 3 9 6 7 2 2 1 1 
11 257  14 1 2 5 9 13 7 1 3 1 1 
12 295  15 0 3 3 15 8 8 3 3 0 1 
13 311  15 0 3 3 7 12 8 9 4 1 0 
14 312  15 0 2 3 10 12 6 9 3 1 0 
15 246 14 14 1 3 3 12 13 4 3 3 0 1 
16 269  14 0 4 3 12 12 1 3 3 1 1 
17 263  14 1 3 3 11 14 7 10 4 1 0 
18 274  15 0 3 3 13 12 2 7 2 0 0 
19 253  14 0 3 4 12 10 4 2 3 1 1 
20 261  14 0 2 3 13 8 2 2 2 0 1 
21 241 14 14 1 2 4 10 12 7 4 3 0 1 
22 240 14 14 0 1 2 11 10 6 1 3 1 1 
23 272  15 0 3 2 10 10 7 4 3 1 0 
24 243 14 14 1 3 3 12 12 7 3 3 0 0 
25 127 4 4 1 2 1 11 11     1 
26 124 4 4 1 3 3 11 11     1 
27 123 4 4 1 1 1 8 8     0 
28 126 4 4 1 2 3 11 14     1 
29 121 4 4 1 3 2 8 11     1 
30 130 4 4 1 1 1 5 8     1 
31 126 4 4 1 2 1 5 11     0 
32 126 4 4 1 1 1 11 11     1 
33 121 4 4 0 2 2 11 11     1 
34 126 4 4 0 1 2 11 11     0 
35 123 4 4 0 2 2 8 11     0 
36 126 4 4 0 1 1 11 11     1 
37 118  4 0 2 3 11 11     0 
38 121 4 4 0 4 4 14 11     1 
39 121 4 4 0 2 3 8 5     0 
40 129 4 4 1 1 1 8 11     1 
41 126 4 4 1 3 2 8 11     1 
42 140  4 1 1 1 8 11     1 
43 130 4 4 1 1 1 5 11     1 
44 128 4 4 1 1 2 11 14     0 
45 120 4 4 1 1 2 11 11     1 
46 119 4 4 1 2 1 8 8     1 
47 128 4 4 0 1 2 11 11     0 
48 121 4 4 0 2 3 8 11     1 
49 127 4 4 0 3 3 11 8     1 
50 129 4 4 0 1 2 5 8     1 
51 128 4 4 0 3 3 11 11     1 
52 127 4 4 0 2 3 11 11     1 
53 129 4 4 0 3 3 11 14     1 
54 120 4 4 0 2 3 11 11     0 
55 92 1 1 1 2 3       1 
56 83 1 1 1 2 1       0 
57 85 1 1 1 1 2       0 
58 82 1 1 1 1 2       1 
59 91 1 1 1 2 3       1 
60 93 1 1 1 2 1       1 
61 91 1 1 1 2 2       1 
62 90 1 1 1 1 1       1 
63 92 1 1 0 1 2       1 
64 84 1 1 0 1 1       1 
65 88 1 1 0 2 1       1 
66 86 1 1 0 2 2       1 
67 82 1 1 1 1 3       0 
68 95  1 1 1 1       0 
69 82 1 1 1 2 1       1 
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ID Age 
(months) 
Grade 
(12) 
Grade 
(full) 
Female Wins 
(I) 
Wins 
(II) 
Mark 
math 
Mark 
German 
Risk Patience Trust Fair Uncover 
(1st game) 
70 83 1 1 1 1 1       1 
71 82 1 1 1 1 2       1 
72 82 1 1 1 1 2       0 
73 93 1 1 1 1 2       1 
74 90 1 1 1 1 1       1 
75 89 1 1 1 1 1       1 
76 89 1 1 1 1 2       0 
77 93 1 1 0 1 1       0 
78 88 1 1 1 1 0       0 
79 84 1 1 0 1 1       1 
80 82 1 1 0 1 3       1 
81 90 1 1 0 2 2       1 
82 93 1 1 0 1 3       1 
83 91 1 1 0 1 2       1 
84 84 1 1 1 0 1       0 
85 186 9 9 0 2 2 10 8 8 1 3 1 0 
86 194  9 1 1 2 10 12 6 2 3 1 1 
87 189 9 9 1 2 4 8 12 5 4 3 0 0 
88 183 9 9 0 3 0 14 12 3 9 3 1 1 
89 190 9 9 0 3 3 6 10 5 7 4 1 1 
90 184 9 9 1 1 1 10 8 5 5 3 1 0 
91 190 9 9 0 2 3 12 10 3 4 4 1 0 
92 185 9 9 1 3 3 14 10 7 1 4 1 0 
93 186 9 9 0 0 1 10 10 3 7 3 1 0 
94 188 9 9 0 2 3 8 10 7 3 2 1 0 
95 191  9 1 0 3 10 8 5 5 2 0 0 
96 186 9 9 0 2 3 6 12 3 6 4 1 1 
97 196  9 1 2 3 12 10 4 8 2 1 1 
98 203  9 0 4 3 12 8 2 9 3 1 1 
99 188 9 9 0 2 2 10 6 8 7 2 1 1 
100 188 9 9 1 0 2 4 6 5 6 4 1 0 
101 184 9 9 1 2 2 8 8 7 4 3 1 1 
102 142 6 6 1 2 3 11 11 2 8 3 1 1 
103 157  6 1 1 1 5 8 4 9 3 1 0 
104 148 6 6 0 2 1 5 5 3 6 3 1 1 
105 152 6 6 0 2 2 8 11 4 0 3 1 1 
106 150 6 6 1 1 2 8 11 4 8 4 1 1 
107 151 6 6 0 3 4 2 5 4 8 4 1 0 
108 153 6 6 1 1 2 8  3 8 3 1 0 
109 148 6 6 0 2 3 8 8 3 8 3 1 1 
110 147 6 6 1 1 1 5 8 3 7 3 1 0 
111 159  6 1 0 1 5 8 8 3 3 1 0 
112 153 6 6 1 2 1 11 11 5 7 2 1 0 
113 145 6 6 1 2 1 8 11 6 9 3 1 1 
114 144 6 6 1 3 2 11 11 4 7 3 1 1 
115 152 6 6 1 2 3 14 11 1 5 3 1 0 
116 164  6 1 1 2 2 5 6 7 3 1 1 
117 187 9 9 0 1 1 4 10 6 5 3 0 0 
118 180 9 9 1 1 2 4 6 1 5 4 0 1 
119 182 9 9 0 3 4 12 10 3 6 3 1 0 
120 184 9 9 1 1 3 10 12 6 9 2 1 0 
121 179 9 9 0 2 3 10 6 6 6 3 0 0 
122 189 9 9 0 2 3 10 12 6 4 3 1 1 
123 181 9 9 0 0 2 10 10 3 6 2 0 0 
124 190 9 9 0 3 3 8 10 5 2 3 1 1 
125 194  9 1 1 2 4 4 5 4 3 0 0 
126 193  9 0 0 1 6 4 8 5 3 0 0 
127 180 9 9 0 3 2 8 12 8 2 2 1 1 
128 190 9 9 1 1 2 12 12 7 9 3 1 0 
129 185 9 9 1 2 4 10 12 9 1 3 1 1 
130 152 6 6 1 2 2 11 11 5 8 3 1 0 
131 143 6 6 0 4 4 14 11 7 9 3 1 1 
132 148 6 6 1 2 1 11 11 5 8 3 0 0 
133 157  6 0 4 2 11 8 6 5 4 1 1 
134 144 6 6 1 2 1 2 8 6 4 3 0 1 
135 151 6 6 0 2 2 11 11 6 5 3 1 1 
136 143 6 6 0 2 2 11 14 7 5 3 1 0 
137 145 6 6 0 1 1 11 14 3 3 2 1 0 
138 152 6 6 0 0 3 8 11 7 5 3 1 0 
139 155  6 0 2 3 14 11 8 1 2 0 1 
140 149 6 6 0 2 3 11 11 8 2 3 1 1 
141 145 6 6 0 2 3 8 11 2 9 3 1 1 
142 148 6 6 0 3 3 11 8 6 6 3 1 1 
143 144 6 6 0 3 2 14 11 1 3 3 0 1 
144 144 6 6 0 2 4 11 11 4 5 3 1 0 
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ID Age 
(months) 
Grade 
(12) 
Grade 
(full) 
Female Wins 
(I) 
Wins 
(II) 
Mark 
math 
Mark 
German 
Risk Patience Trust Fair Uncover 
(1st game) 
145 242 14 14 1 3 2 10 13 7 2 2 1 1 
146 246 14 14 0 3 3 8 10 4 5 3 0 1 
147 246 14 14 1 1 2 11 12 3 5 2 1 1 
148 243 14 14 0 3 3 12 12 7 2 2 1 1 
149 240 14 14 1 2 2 10 13 3 9 2 1 1 
150 242 14 14 1 1 2 12 9 2 8 2 1 0 
151 240 14 14 0 3 4 14 15 7 5 3 1 1 
152 244 14 14 0 3 3 8 13 8 2 2 1 1 
153 245 14 14 0 1 1 10 12 5 2 3 1 0 
154 241 14 14 1 2 1 10 10 8 3 2 0 0 
155 248 14 14 0 3 4 11 8 7 2 3 0 1 
156 242 14 14 1 3 2 10 11 4 2 3 1 0 
157 278 15 15 1 1 1 6 15 3 6 2 0 1 
158 277 15 15 1 2 3 10 9 9 9 3 1 1 
159 286 15 15 0 2 3 10 12 7 4 2 0 1 
160 283 15 15 1 1 1 10 13 2 0 2 0 0 
161 287 15 15 0 3 6 9 8 8 4 2 0 1 
162 276 15 15 1 3 4 12 11 2 2 3 1 1 
163 281 15 15 0 3 3 8 10 2 1 2 0 1 
164 283 15 15 1 3 3 12 15 1 3 3 1 1 
165 284 15 15 1 2 5 10 13 2 5 3 1 1 
166 280 15 15 1 1 3 6 13 5 2 3 0 1 
167 277 15 15 1 2 3 12 13 3 9 3 0 1 
168 277 15 15 0 3 5 10 13 3 2 3 0 1 
169 276 15 15 1 2 5 15 12 2 1 3 1 1 
170 277 15 15 0 1 1 11 8 8 2 3 1 1 
171 287 15 15 0 3 3 10 14 5 2 2 1 1 
172 276 15 15 0 4 3 10 12 3 4 3 1 0 
173 281 15 15 0 3 4 10 10 8 7 4 1 1 
174 287 15 15 0 2 1 11 12 7 3 3 1 0 
175 282 15 15 1 4 3 12 12 2 8 2 0 0 
Table D: Data 
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Online Appendix E: Additional regressions 
The following subsections present additional regression results for the dependent variables 
analyzed in the paper. For the regressions presented in detail in the main part of the paper this 
appendix also includes robustness checks that are based on different data sets. In this study we 
use the following data sets:  
(i) the restricted data set with subjects falling into 12-month ranges (used in the main part),  
(ii) the restricted data set without game G(m=3, k=4),  
(iii) the unrestricted data set and 
(iv) the unrestricted data set without game G(m=3, k=4). 
These data sets yield the summary statistics presented in Table E.1. The following analyses 
indicate the respective data set the regression is run for. 
 
 N Female Minimum Age  Maximum Age  
Grade 1 
(i) and (ii) 
(iii) and (iv) 
 
29 
30 
 
66% 
67% 
 
06 y 10 m 
06 y 10 m 
 
07 y 09 m 
07 y 11 m 
Grade 4 
(i) and (ii) 
(iii) and (iv) 
 
28 
30 
 
50% 
50% 
 
09 y 11 m 
09 y 10 m 
 
10 y 10 m 
11 y 08 m 
Grade 6 
(i) and (ii) 
(iii) and (iv) 
 
25 
30 
 
44% 
47% 
 
11 y 10 m 
11 y 10 m 
 
12 y 09 m 
13 y 08 m 
Grade 9 
(i) and (ii) 
(iii) and (iv) 
 
24 
30 
 
38% 
43% 
 
14 y 11 m 
14 y 11 m 
 
15 y 10 m 
16 y 11 m 
University young 
(i) and (ii) 
(iii) and (iv) 
 
21 
27 
 
57% 
52% 
 
20 y 00 m 
20 y 00 m 
 
20 y 10 m 
22 y 05 m 
University old 
(i) and (ii) 
(iii) and (iv) 
 
19 
28 
 
53% 
50% 
 
23 y 00 m 
22 y 08 m 
 
23 y 11 m 
26 y 01 m 
Table E.1: Data sets (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
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Online Appendix E.1: Improvement between parts within games 
The results presented in section 5.2 of the paper suggest that performance generally increases 
from part 1 to part 2. This effect is significant for 1st graders, 9th graders and old university 
students. In addition we ran the following ordered probit regressions to study how the 
improvement differs across age groups in the four games that exhibit the largest variation in 
performance, i.e. G(m=8, k=4), G(m=11, k=4), G(m=19, k=4), and G(m=21, k=4). 
The dependent variable takes the values -1, 0, and 1 indicating whether subjects won a 
specific game in part 1 but lost in part 2, won or lost the game in both parts, or won the game 
in part 2 but lost in part 1. The results in Tables E.1.1 based on data set (i) reveal significant 
age differences for games G(m=19, k=4) and G(m=21, k=4). They suggest that the increase in 
performance for game G(m=19, k=4) is particularly driven by 1st graders while the increase in 
performance for game G(m=21, k=4) is particularly driven by young and old university 
students. 
 
 Ordered Probit - dependent variable: improvement between parts 
 G(m = 19, k=4)  G(m = 8, k=4) G(m = 11, k=4) G(m = 21, k=4) 
Grade 1 0.755** (0.353) 0.188 (0.335) -0.301 (0.326) 0.318 (0.525) 
Grade 4 0.200 (0.352) 0.281 (0.339) -0.296 (0.328) -0.548 (0.469) 
Grade 9 0.247 (0.371) 0.209 (0.354) 0.318 (0.342) 0.318 (0.508) 
Uni young -0.427 (0.386) 0.340 (0.365) -0.111 (0.351) 1.184** (0.560) 
Uni old 0.000 (0.391) 0.103 (0.380) 0.187 (0.364) 1.756*** (0.551) 
Adj. R-squared 0.056 0.006 0.023 0.191 
N 146 146 146 146 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.1.1: Regressions on improvement across games based on data set (i) 
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Online Appendix E.2: Number of games won in part 1 
In order to control for subject-specific differences that are not captured by grade or gender 
variables, we also present OLS-regressions in the paper that include the number of games 
won as the dependent variables and additional independent variables that control for 
uncovering behavior, school grades, and self-reported personality attitudes.  
The regressions of analysis (i) in the paper are based on data set (i). Below we present the 
OLS-regressions for the remaining three data sets with the number of games won in part 1 as 
the dependent variable in Tables E.2.1a, E.2.1b, and E.2.1c. As an additional robustness check 
we also present an ordered probit regression based on data set (i) in Table E.2.2. 
 
 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -1.005*** (0.308)     
Grade 4 -0.143 (0.279) -0.200 (0.292)   
Grade 9 -0.019 (0.275) 0.014 (0.288) 0.003 (0.294) 
Uni young 0.143 (0.317) 0.064 (0.333) 0.088 (0.359) 
Uni old 0.405 (0.316) 0.371 (0.331) 0.370 (0.356) 
Grade 1 x female 0.163 (0.291)     
Grade 4 x female -0.336 (0.280) -0.202 (0.297)   
Grade 6 x female -0.239 (0.299) -0.228 (0.32) -0.241 (0.333) 
Grade 9 x female -0.420 (0.312) -0.388 (0.326) -0.421 (0.335) 
Uni young x female -0.087 (0.328) -0.096 (0.345) -0.110 (0.365) 
Uni old x female -0.575* (0.339) -0.617* (0.359) -0.620 (0.382) 
Uncover treasure  0.353** (0.136) 0.399** (0.158) 0.385** (0.185) 
Mark German   -0.009 (0.039) -0.013 (0.045) 
Mark math   0.091*** (0.032) 0.090** (0.037) 
Fairness     -0.103 (0.205) 
Patience     -0.001 (0.037) 
Risk     -0.001 (0.042) 
Trust     0.096 (0.159) 
Constant 0.988*** (0.216) 0.183 (0.456) 0.067 (0.807) 
Adj. R-squared 0.258 0.212 0.212 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.2.1a: Regressions part 1 based on data set (ii) 
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 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -1.062*** (0.327)     
Grade 4 -0.137 (0.291) -0.168 (0.299)   
Grade 9 -0.136 (0.283) -0.064 (0.292) -0.041 (0.295) 
Uni young 0.242 (0.303) 0.179 (0.313) 0.344 (0.325) 
Uni old 0.525* (0.296) 0.485 (0.306) 0.577* (0.317) 
Grade 1 x female 0.107 (0.315)     
Grade 4 x female -0.505* (0.296) -0.361 (0.309)   
Grade 6 x female -0.543* (0.298) -0.335 (0.316) -0.394 (0.325) 
Grade 9 x female -0.647** (0.298) -0.621** (0.306) -0.613* (0.309) 
Uni young x female -0.145 (0.315) -0.155 (0.327) -0.184 (0.334) 
Uni old x female -0.646** (0.306) -0.670** (0.319) -0.694** (0.339) 
Uncover treasure  0.525*** (0.134) 0.543*** (0.150) 0.567*** (0.170) 
Mark German   0.005 (0.036) 0.012 (0.040) 
Mark math   0.093*** (0.029) 0.096*** (0.032) 
Fairness     0.003 (0.189) 
Patience     0.035 (0.032) 
Risk     -0.016 (0.038) 
Trust     0.275* (0.145) 
Constant 1.889*** 0.222 0.906** (0.435) -0.137 (0.723) 
Adj. R-squared 0.322 0.313 0.361 
N 175 144 114 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.2.1b: Regressions part 1 based on data set (iii) 
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 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -1.092 (0.301)     
Grade 4 -0.213 (0.267) -0.240 (0.276)   
Grade 9 -0.055 (0.260) 0.006 (0.269) 0.015 (0.267) 
Uni young 0.215 (0.279) 0.163 (0.289) 0.321 (0.294) 
Uni old 0.445 (0.272) 0.410 (0.282) 0.497* (0.287) 
Grade 1 x female 0.162 (0.290)     
Grade 4 x female -0.408 (0.272) -0.276 (0.285)   
Grade 6 x female -0.430 (0.274) -0.299 (0.291) -0.381 (0.294) 
Grade 9 x female -0.606** (0.274) -0.584** (0.282) -0.574** (0.280) 
Uni young x female -0.198 (0.289) -0.207 (0.302) -0.235 (0.302) 
Uni old x female -0.625** (0.281) -0.641** (0.294) -0.654** (0.307) 
Uncover treasure  0.373*** (0.123) 0.381*** (0.138) 0.400** (0.154) 
Mark German   0.002 (0.033) 0.001 (0.036) 
Mark math   0.084*** (0.027) 0.083*** (0.029) 
Fairness     0.006 (0.171) 
Patience     0.041 (0.029) 
Risk     -0.011 (0.034) 
Trust     0.212 (0.131) 
Constant 1.056*** (0.204) 0.205 (0.401) -0.585 (0.654) 
Adj. R-squared  0.271 0.313 
N 175 144 114 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.2.1c: Regressions part 1 based on data set (iv) 
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 Ordered probit - dependent variable: number of games won in part 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -1.345*** (0.465)     
Grade 4 -0.069 (0.407) -0.166 (0.409)   
Grade 9 -0.105 (0.401) -0.059 (0.403) -0.067 (0.408) 
Uni young 0.251 (0.465) 0.143 (0.47) 0.143 (0.499) 
Uni old 0.651 (0.465) 0.607 (0.468) 0.574 (0.499) 
Grade 1 x female 0.116 (0.436)     
Grade 4 x female -0.606 (0.413) -0.381 (0.416)   
Grade 6 x female -0.289 (0.437) -0.187 (0.448) -0.208 (0.462) 
Grade 9 x female -0.671 (0.461) -0.616 (0.460) -0.679 (0.467) 
Uni young x female -0.050 (0.482) -0.082 (0.486) -0.106 (0.511) 
Uni old x female -0.785 (0.499) -0.832 (0.507) -0.840 (0.536) 
Uncover treasure  0.693*** (0.206) 0.712*** (0.227) 0.664** (0.263) 
Mark German   -0.026 (0.054) -0.023 (0.062) 
Mark math   0.137*** (0.046) 0.140*** (0.052) 
Fairness     -0.179 (0.285) 
Patience     -0.018 (0.051) 
Risk     0.000 (0.058) 
Trust     0.194 (0.221) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.122 0.105 0.106 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.2.2: Regressions part 1 (ordered probit) based on data set (i) 
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Online Appendix E.3: Number of games won in part 2 
The OLS-regressions of analysis (i) in the paper that take the number of games won in part 2 
as a dependent variable are based on data set (i). Below we present the OLS-regressions for 
the remaining three data sets in Tables E.3.1a, E.3.1b, and E.3.1c. As an additional robustness 
check we also present an ordered probit regression based on data set (i) in Table E.3.2. 
 
 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -0.935** (0.394)     
Grade 4 -0.071 (0.357) -0.129 (0.368)   
Grade 9 -0.180 (0.352) -0.140 (0.363) -0.143 (0.393) 
Uni young 0.047 (0.406) -0.040 (0.420) 0.017 (0.479) 
Uni old 0.531 (0.404) 0.498 (0.418) 0.511 (0.476) 
Grade 1 x female 0.033 (0.372)     
Grade 4 x female -1.051*** (0.358) -0.911** (0.375)   
Grade 6 x female -0.848** (0.382) -0.845** (0.404) -0.872* (0.445) 
Grade 9 x female 0.203 (0.399) 0.240 (0.411) 0.112 (0.448) 
Uni young x female -0.168 (0.420) -0.156 (0.435) -0.126 (0.488) 
Uni old x female -0.130 (0.434) -0.160 (0.452) -0.165 (0.511) 
Uncover treasure  0.358** (0.174) 0.450** (0.199) 0.501** (0.247) 
Mark German   -0.020 (0.049) -0.014 (0.060) 
Mark math 
 
 0.097** (0.040) 0.102** (0.049) 
Fairness     -0.280 (0.274) 
Patience     0.004 (0.049) 
Risk     0.017 (0.056) 
Trust     0.420* (0.212) 
Constant 1.413*** (0.276) 0.634 (0.575) -0.610 (1.078) 
Adj. R-squared 0.267 0.195 0.259 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.3.1a: Regressions part 2 based on data set (ii) 
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 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -0.912** (0.375)     
Grade 4 0.011 (0.333) -0.011 (0.339)   
Grade 9 -0.242 (0.324) -0.182 (0.331) -0.166 (0.352) 
Uni young 0.202 (0.348) 0.148 (0.355) 0.235 (0.388) 
Uni old 0.494 (0.339) 0.463 (0.346) 0.483 (0.378) 
Grade 1 x female -0.077 (0.362)     
Grade 4 x female -1.149*** (0.340) -1.049*** (0.350)   
Grade 6 x female -0.876** (0.341) -0.778** (0.358) -0.783** (0.387) 
Grade 9 x female 0.280 (0.342) 0.301 (0.347) 0.278 (0.369) 
Uni young x female -0.065 (0.361) -0.071 (0.371) -0.084 (0.398) 
Uni old x female -0.058 (0.351) -0.085 (0.362) -0.058 (0.404) 
Uncover treasure  0.409 (0.153) 0.441** (0.170) 0.520** (0.203) 
Mark German   0.008 (0.041) 0.015 (0.048) 
Mark math 
 
 0.068** (0.033) 0.068* (0.038) 
Fairness     -0.189 (0.225) 
Patience     0.011 (0.038) 
Risk     0.004 (0.045) 
Trust     0.333* (0.173) 
Constant 2.344*** (0.254) 1.569*** (0.493) 0.536 (0.861) 
Adj. R-squared 0.304 0.294 0.262 
N 175 144 114 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.3.1b: Regressions part 2 based on data set (iii) 
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 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -0.911** (0.364)     
Grade 4 0.010 (0.324) -0.010 (0.330)   
Grade 9 -0.125 (0.315) -0.066 (0.323) -0.052 (0.341) 
Uni young 0.203 (0.338) 0.150 (0.346) 0.241 (0.375) 
Uni old 0.493 (0.330) 0.467 (0.338) 0.482 (0.366) 
Grade 1 x female 0.022 (0.351)     
Grade 4 x female -1.148*** (0.330) -1.041*** (0.342)   
Grade 6 x female -0.877*** (0.331) -0.774** (0.349) -0.785** (0.375) 
Grade 9 x female 0.162 (0.332) 0.183 (0.338) 0.160 (0.357) 
Uni young x female -0.066 (0.350) -0.062 (0.361) -0.084 (0.386) 
Uni old x female -0.058 (0.341) -0.076 (0.353) -0.050 (0.391) 
Uncover treasure  0.405*** (0.149) 0.444*** (0.166) 0.528*** (0.197) 
Mark German   0.001 (0.040) 0.008 (0.046) 
Mark math 
 
 0.072** (0.032) 0.073* (0.037) 
Fairness     -0.218 (0.218) 
Patience     0.017 (0.037) 
Risk     0.007 (0.043) 
Trust     0.340** (0.167) 
Constant 1.346*** (0.247) 0.594 (0.481) -0.491 (0.835) 
Adj. R-squared 0.306 0.303 0.273 
N 175 144 114 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.3.1c: Regressions part 2 based on data set (iv) 
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 Ordered probit - dependent variable: number of games won in part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -1.070** (0.450) 0.000    
Grade 4 -0.086 (0.399) -0.144 (0.400)   
Grade 9 -0.331 (0.395) -0.304 (0.396) -0.283 (0.398) 
Uni young 0.052 (0.453) -0.031 (0.457) 0.008 (0.484) 
Uni old 0.510 (0.458) 0.493 (0.461) 0.488 (0.486) 
Grade 1 x female -0.123 (0.424)     
Grade 4 x female -1.223*** (0.415) -1.074** (0.423)   
Grade 6 x female -0.985** (0.437) -1.003** (0.453) -0.953** (0.461) 
Grade 9 x female 0.349 (0.445) 0.397 (0.447) 0.202 (0.452) 
Uni young x female -0.197 (0.470) -0.190 (0.473) -0.113 (0.493) 
Uni old x female -0.111 (0.487) -0.148 (0.494) -0.094 (0.518) 
Uncover treasure  0.386* (0.198) 0.448** (0.221) 0.460* (0.253) 
Mark German   -0.020 (0.054) -0.015 (0.061) 
Mark math   0.097** (0.044) 0.095* (0.050) 
Fairness     -0.286 (0.278) 
Patience     -0.006 (0.049) 
Risk     0.029 (0.057) 
Trust     0.466** (0.219) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.103 0.100 0.089 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.3.2: Regressions part 2 (ordered probit) based on data set (i) 
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Online Appendix E.4: Number of games won in total 
In the regressions we control for several characteristics of the subjects. In the OLS-
regressions presented in Table 5 (specification (3)) of the paper and in Appendix E.3 the 
performance within part 2 is positively correlated with math grades and self-reported trust. In 
the main part of the paper we point out that this positive relationship is also found when 
considering the number of games won in total as a dependent variable (i.e. in part 1 and part 
2). The respective regression results are shown in Table E.4.1.  
The weakly significant gender effect observed for sixth graders reported in the paper for part 
2 turns insignificant for data set (i) when pooling observations from part 1 and part 2. 
However, it remains significant or weakly significant when running the regression on data 
sets (ii), (iii), and (iv) (not shown). As an additional robustness check we also present an 
ordered probit regression based on data set (i) in Table E.4.2. 
 
 OLS - dependent variable: number of games won in total 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -1.899*** (0.617)     
Grade 4 -0.143 (0.559) -0.255 (0.581)   
Grade 9 -0.306 (0.552) -0.239 (0.573) -0.264 (0.601) 
Uni young 0.233 (0.636) 0.080 (0.663) 0.094 (0.733) 
Uni old 0.991 (0.633) 0.936 (0.660) 0.894 (0.728) 
Grade 1 x female 0.017 (0.583)     
Grade 4 x female -1.475** (0.561) -1.194* (0.591)   
Grade 6 x female -1.084* (0.598) -0.982 (0.638) -0.974 (0.681) 
Grade 9 x female -0.223 (0.625) -0.160 (0.649) -0.347 (0.685) 
Uni young x female -0.219 (0.658) -0.209 (0.686) -0.148 (0.747) 
Uni old x female -0.707 (0.680) -0.760 (0.714) -0.717 (0.781) 
Uncover treasure  0.828*** (0.272) 0.955*** (0.315) 0.973** (0.378) 
Mark German   -0.041 (0.077) -0.034 (0.092) 
Mark math   0.188*** (0.063) 0.195** (0.075) 
Fairness     -0.394 (0.419) 
Patience     -0.023 (0.075) 
Risk     0.027 (0.086) 
Trust     0.570* (0.324) 
Constant 4.253*** (0.432) 2.798*** (0.908) 1.303 (1.648) 
Adj. R-squared 0.260 0.211 0.151 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.4.1: Regressions pooled based on data set (i)  
58 
 Ordered probit - dependent variable: number of games won 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 -1.312*** (0.436)     
Grade 4 -0.094 (0.387) -0.171 (0.388)   
Grade 9 -0.286 (0.383) -0.271 (0.385) -0.271 (0.388) 
Uni young 0.148 (0.442) 0.062 (0.446) 0.080 (0.475) 
Uni old 0.709 (0.447) 0.720 (0.450) 0.708 (0.478) 
Grade 1 x female -0.056 (0.408)     
Grade 4 x female -1.068*** (0.397) -0.849** (0.404)   
Grade 6 x female -0.703* (0.418) -0.642 (0.429) -0.643 (0.441) 
Grade 9 x female -0.072 (0.435) -0.002 (0.438) -0.150 (0.443) 
Uni young x female -0.137 (0.458) -0.159 (0.462) -0.122 (0.484) 
Uni old x female -0.542 (0.477) -0.599 (0.484) -0.558 (0.510) 
Uncover treasure  0.611*** (0.194) 0.668*** (0.217) 0.684*** (0.252) 
Mark German   -0.034 (0.052) -0.032 (0.059) 
Mark math   0.136*** (0.044) 0.139*** (0.050) 
Fairness     -0.277 (0.272) 
Patience     -0.009 (0.048) 
Risk     0.025 (0.055) 
Trust     0.395* (0.212) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.091 0.089 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.4.2: Regressions pooled (ordered probit) based on data set (i) 
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Online Appendix E.5: Difference in the number of games won between part 1 and part 2 
Also the regressions of analysis (ii) on the improvement between part 1 and part 2 with 
respect to Hypothesis 2 in the paper are based on data set (i). Below we present these OLS-
regressions for the remaining three data sets with the number of games won in part 2 minus 
the number of games won in part 1 as the dependent variable in Tables E.5.1a, E.5.1b, and 
E.5.1c. As an additional robustness check we also present an ordered probit regression based 
on data set (i) in Table E.5.2. 
 
 OLS - dependent variable:  
difference in number of games won between part 1 and part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.070 (0.376)     
Grade 4 0.071 (0.341) 0.070 (0.348)   
Grade 9 -0.161 (0.336) -0.154 (0.344) -0.146 (0.38) 
Uni young -0.096 (0.387) -0.103 (0.398) -0.071 (0.463) 
Uni old 0.126 (0.386) 0.127 (0.395) 0.141 (0.460) 
Grade 1 x female -0.130 (0.355)     
Grade 4 x female -0.715** (0.342) -0.709** (0.354)   
Grade 6 x female -0.609* (0.365) -0.617 (0.382) -0.630 (0.430) 
Grade 9 x female 0.623 (0.381) 0.628 (0.389) 0.533 (0.433) 
Uni young x female -0.082 (0.401) -0.060 (0.411) -0.016 (0.472) 
Uni old x female 0.444 (0.414) 0.457 (0.428) 0.455 (0.493) 
Uncover treasure  0.005 (0.166) 0.052 (0.189) 0.116 (0.239) 
Mark German   -0.011 (0.046) 0.000 (0.058) 
Mark math   0.006 (0.038) 0.012 (0.047) 
Fairness     -0.176 (0.265) 
Patience     0.005 (0.047) 
Risk     0.018 (0.054) 
Trust     0.324 (0.205) 
Constant 0.425 (0.264) 0.451 (0.544) -0.677 (1.041) 
Adj. R-squared 0.047 0.052 -0.010 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.5.1a: Regressions on improvement based on data set (ii) 
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 OLS - dependent variable:  
difference in number of games won between part 1 and part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.150 (0.396)     
Grade 4 0.148 (0.352) 0.157 (0.359)   
Grade 9 -0.106 (0.342) -0.119 (0.351) -0.125 (0.385) 
Uni young -0.040 (0.367) -0.031 (0.376) -0.109 (0.424) 
Uni old -0.031 (0.358) -0.022 (0.368) -0.094 (0.413) 
Grade 1 x female -0.185 (0.382)     
Grade 4 x female -0.644* (0.359) -0.687* (0.372)   
Grade 6 x female -0.334 (0.360) -0.443 (0.380) -0.389 (0.423) 
Grade 9 x female 0.927** (0.361) 0.922** (0.368) 0.891** (0.403) 
Uni young x female 0.080 (0.381) 0.084 (0.393) 0.101 (0.436) 
Uni old x female 0.588 (0.370) 0.585 (0.384) 0.636 (0.442) 
Uncover treasure  -0.116 (0.162) -0.102 (0.180) -0.047 (0.222) 
Mark German   0.003 (0.043) 0.003 (0.052) 
Mark math   -0.025 (0.035) -0.028 (0.042) 
Fairness     -0.192 (0.247) 
Patience     -0.024 (0.042) 
Risk     0.020 (0.049) 
Trust     0.059 (0.189) 
Constant 0.455* (0.269) 0.663 (0.523) 0.673 (0.942) 
Adj. R-squared 0.048 0.057 0.002 
N 175 144 114 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.5.1b: Regressions on improvement based on data set (iii) 
  
61 
 OLS - dependent variable:  
difference in number of games won between part 1 and part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.181 (0.368)     
Grade 4 0.224 (0.327) 0.230 (0.334)   
Grade 9 -0.070 (0.318) -0.072 (0.326) -0.066 (0.355) 
Uni young -0.012 (0.341) -0.012 (0.349) -0.080 (0.391) 
Uni old 0.048 (0.333) 0.057 (0.341) -0.015 (0.381) 
Grade 1 x female -0.140 (0.355)     
Grade 4 x female -0.740** (0.333) -0.764** (0.345)   
Grade 6 x female -0.447 (0.335) -0.474 (0.353) -0.405 (0.390) 
Grade 9 x female 0.767** (0.335) 0.767** (0.342) 0.734* (0.372) 
Uni young x female 0.132 (0.354) 0.145 (0.365) 0.151 (0.402) 
Uni old x female 0.567 (0.344) 0.565 (0.356) 0.604 (0.408) 
Uncover treasure  0.032 (0.150) 0.063 (0.167) 0.128 (0.205) 
Mark German   -0.001 (0.040) 0.007 (0.048) 
Mark math   -0.012 (0.033) -0.010 (0.039) 
Fairness     -0.224 (0.228) 
Patience     -0.024 (0.038) 
Risk     0.018 (0.045) 
Trust     0.128 (0.174) 
Cut 1 0.290 (0.25) 0.390 (0.486) 0.094 (0.869) 
Adj. R-squared 0.061 0.067 0.014 
N 175 144 114 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.5.1c: Regressions on improvement based on data set (iv) 
  
62 
 Ordered Probit - dependent variable:  
difference in number of games won between part 1 and part 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.050 (0.440)     
Grade 4 0.035 (0.401) 0.052 (0.402)   
Grade 9 -0.148 (0.395) -0.129 (0.396) -0.107 (0.398) 
Uni young -0.125 (0.455) -0.119 (0.459) -0.019 (0.485) 
Uni old 0.065 (0.453) 0.053 (0.455) 0.112 (0.481) 
Grade 1 x female -0.186 (0.416)     
Grade 4 x female -0.761* (0.407) -0.784* (0.415)   
Grade 6 x female -0.721* (0.434) -0.841* (0.448) -0.843* (0.458) 
Grade 9 x female 0.797* (0.446) 0.784* (0.447) 0.649 (0.452) 
Uni young x female -0.159 (0.471) -0.154 (0.475) -0.130 (0.493) 
Uni old x female 0.500 (0.487) 0.499 (0.494) 0.447 (0.516) 
Uncover treasure  -0.136 (0.195) -0.096 (0.218) -0.014 (0.250) 
Mark German   -0.001 (0.053) 0.003 (0.060) 
Mark math   -0.003 (0.044) -0.001 (0.049) 
Fairness     -0.166 (0.277) 
Patience     0.025 (0.050) 
Risk     0.011 (0.056) 
Trust     0.303 (0.215) 
Adj. R-squared 0.045 0.056 0.053 
N 146 116 88 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.5.2: Regressions on improvement (ordered probit) based on data set (i) 
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Online Appendix E.6: Correctly identified winning positions in part 1 
In order to maximize the likelihood function of analysis (iii) presented in section 5.4 some 
distribution for the random variable T has to be selected. The positive random variable T can 
be thought of as the number of correctly identified winning positions in the remaining game 
or as the number of successful steps of backward reasoning. Table E.6.1 shows the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) values for part 1 that result from different distributional 
assumptions typically made in survival analysis. The BIC is an indicator for model fit 
punishing the use of additional parameters. Based on BIC we pick the generalized gamma 
distribution as it yields the lowest value across model specifications.  
Tables E.6.2.a and E.6.2b show the results for the regressions based on data sets (iii) and (iv) 
based on interval-censoring and the generalized gamma distribution. The models for data set 
(ii) did not achieve convergence and could not be estimated using the same procedure. Also 
specification (3) based on data set (iv) did not achieve convergence.  
In the analysis of correctly identified winning positions we do not count moves as “correct” 
that were made to a winning position, but cannot be based on backward analysis. These 
moves were made before uncovering the treasure and therefore made without knowing its 
position. Table E.6.3 shows the regressions based on data set (i) that result when counting 
these moves as correct anyway.  
We also considered two alternative approaches that yielded similar results: First, the method 
introduced by Royston and Parmar (2002) that models the baseline cumulative hazard 
function of a proportional hazards model as a cubic spline (see Table E.6.4). Second, a Cox 
proportional hazards model with right-censoring and midpoint imputation (see Table E.6.5). 
 
 
  Part 1  
Distribution (1) (2) (3) 
Exponential 1578.801 1272.773 994.707 
Weibull 1578.793 1263.760 985.327 
Gompertz 1585.956 1277.613 998.080 
Log-logistic 1540.285 1234.048 963.439 
Log-normal 1538.458 1231.163 960.794 
Gamma 1571.521 1255.151 978.208 
Generalized gamma 1489.294 1199.871 937.271 
Inverse Gaussian 1535.972 1227.410 957.909 
Table E.6.1: Model comparisons based on data set (i): Bayesian information criterion 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.806 (0.206)     
Grade 4 0.957 (0.764) 0.898 (0.493)   
Grade 9 0.841 (0.289) 0.819 (0.253) 0.824 (0.231) 
Uni young 1.359 (0.108) 1.237 (0.228) 1.352* (0.091) 
Uni old 1.385* (0.066) 1.269 (0.148) 1.397* (0.076) 
Grade 1 x female 0.830 (0.125)     
Grade 4 x female 0.845 (0.280) 0.874 (0.401)   
Grade 6 x female 0.729* (0.080) 0.785 (0.156) 0.786 (0.197) 
Grade 9 x female 0.794 (0.195) 0.790 (0.170) 0.834 (0.338) 
Uni young x female 0.801 (0.118) 0.817 (0.155) 0.814 (0.132) 
Uni old x female 0.734** (0.012) 0.761** (0.035) 0.723** (0.018) 
Mark German   0.996 (0.814) 1.001 (0.973) 
Mark math   1.040** (0.018) 1.040** (0.021) 
Fairness     1.022 (0.801) 
Patience     1.009 (0.538) 
Risk     0.981 (0.282) 
Trust     1.130* (0.086) 
Constant 1.548** (0.028) 1.197 (0.495) 0.757 (0.482) 
Log pseudolikelihood -827.598 -679.754 -535.684 
Number of moves 1586 1334 1068 
Number of individuals 175 144 114 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.6.2a: Regressions part 1 based on data set (iii) 
  
65 
 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.615*** (0.008)   - - 
Grade 4 0.717 (0.319) 0.714 (0.117) - - 
Grade 9 0.826 (0.327) 0.858 (0.355) - - 
Uni young 1.163 (0.322) 1.104 (0.509) - - 
Uni old 1.195 (0.201) 1.140 (0.331) - - 
Grade 1 x female 0.844 (0.455)   - - 
Grade 4 x female 0.971 (0.939) 0.990 (0.964) - - 
Grade 6 x female 0.707** (0.010) 0.728** (0.030) - - 
Grade 9 x female 0.766 (0.262) 0.732* (0.057) - - 
Uni young x female 0.797 (0.117) 0.804 (0.137) - - 
Uni old x female 0.697** (0.027) 0.732** (0.040) - - 
Mark German   1.000 (0.992) - - 
Mark math   1.036** (0.035) - - 
Fairness     - - 
Patience     - - 
Risk     - - 
Trust     - - 
Constant 1.640 (0.162) 1.259 (0.329) - - 
Log pseudolikelihood -782.052 -646.425 - 
Number of moves 1411 1190 - 
Number of individuals 175 144 - 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.6.2b: Regressions part 1 based on data set (iv) 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.857 (0.166)     
Grade 4 0.991 (0.105) 0.944 (0.057)   
Grade 9 0.921 (0.123) 0.906 (0.067) 0.913 (0.121) 
Uni young 1.319 (0.282) 1.282 (0.227) 1.269 (0.253) 
Uni old 1.475** (0.280) 1.446** (0.227) 1.455** (0.267) 
Grade 1 x female 0.883 (0.135)     
Grade 4 x female 0.917 (0.132) 1.015 (0.121)   
Grade 6 x female 0.928 (0.130) 1.059 (0.097) 1.073 (0.117) 
Grade 9 x female 0.839 (0.139) 0.879 (0.144) 0.867 (0.103) 
Uni young x female 0.872 (0.176) 0.882 (0.193) 0.914 (0.192) 
Uni old x female 0.715** (0.119) 0.739* (0.119) 0.707** (0.117) 
Mark German   0.977 (0.014) 0.985 (0.024) 
Mark math   1.025 (0.02) 1.027 (0.020) 
Fairness     0.975 (0.067) 
Patience     0.992 (0.009) 
Risk     0.994 (0.017) 
Trust     1.085 (0.089) 
Constant 1.220 (0.302) 1.005 (0.123) 0.798 (0.354) 
Log pseudolikelihood -723.690 -570.794 -430.039 
Number of moves 1,317 1,073 821 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.6.3: Regressions part 1 based on data set (i) - without controlling for uncovering 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.360* (0.186)     
Grade 4 0.026 (0.267) 0.037 (0.229)   
Grade 9 0.298 (0.226) 0.302 (0.220) 0.286 (0.243) 
Uni young -0.139 (0.256) -0.125 (0.312) -0.251 (0.332) 
Uni old -0.213 (0.245) -0.207 (0.242) -0.284 (0.252) 
Grade 1 x female 0.188 (0.172)     
Grade 4 x female 0.419 (0.283) 0.391* (0.226)   
Grade 6 x female 0.408* (0.231) 0.343 (0.245) 0.395 (0.290) 
Grade 9 x female 0.282 (0.280) 0.284 (0.268) 0.271 (0.321) 
Uni young x female 0.173 (0.314) 0.165 (0.304) 0.228 (0.279) 
Uni old x female 0.467** (0.216) 0.458** (0.229) 0.528** (0.220) 
Mark German   0.008 (0.027) 0.008 (0.034) 
Mark math   -0.016 (0.026) 0.003 (0.032) 
Fairness     0.059 (0.152) 
Patience     -0.030 (0.029) 
Risk     0.009 (0.037) 
Trust     -0.009 (0.127) 
Constant -2.959*** (0.285) -3.266*** (0.447) -3.442*** (0.869) 
Log pseudolikelihood -677.188 -538.531 -407.780 
Number of moves 1,317 1,073 821 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on the individual level (100 draws) are given in parentheses. Parameters 
are given as log-hazard ratios. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.6.4: Royston-Parmar regressions part 1 based on data set (i) 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 1.389** (0.226)     
Grade 4 1.010 (0.193) 1.032 (0.195)   
Grade 9 1.237 (0.232) 1.234 (0.237) 1.223 (0.233) 
Uni young 0.871 (0.202) 0.888 (0.208) 0.824 (0.207) 
Uni old 0.817 (0.159) 0.822 (0.167) 0.781 (0.168) 
Grade 1 x female 1.136 (0.134)     
Grade 4 x female 1.392* (0.258) 1.345 (0.244)   
Grade 6 x female 1.354* (0.235) 1.293 (0.237) 1.330 (0.237) 
Grade 9 x female 1.271 (0.226) 1.276 (0.218) 1.278 (0.226) 
Uni young x female 1.166 (0.263) 1.164 (0.266) 1.189 (0.280) 
Uni old x female 1.440** (0.248) 1.446** (0.255) 1.487** (0.258) 
Mark German   1.005 (0.021) 1.005 (0.023) 
Mark math   0.978 (0.017) 0.991 (0.020) 
Fairness     1.035 (0.124) 
Patience     0.984 (0.019) 
Risk     1.002 (0.024) 
Trust     0.968 (0.083) 
Log pseudolikelihood -4188.778 -3097.839 -2224.270 
Number of moves 1,317 1,073 821 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Parameters are given as hazard 
ratios. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.6.5: Cox proportional hazard regressions with midpoint imputation part 1 based on 
data set (i) 
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Online Appendix E.7: Correctly identified winning positions in part 2 
Table E.7.1 shows the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values for part 2 that result from 
different distributional assumptions typically made in survival analysis. Also for part 2 the 
generalized gamma distribution yields the best model fit.  
Tables E.7.2.a, E.7.2b, and E.7.2c show the results for the regressions based on data sets (ii), 
(iii), and (iv) based on interval-censoring and the generalized gamma distribution. Table E.7.3 
shows the regressions that result when counting moves as correct that were made to winning 
positions before uncovering the treasure for data set (i).  
Table E.7.4 shows the regressions based on data set (i) using the method introduced by 
Royston and Parmar (2002). A Cox proportional hazards model with right-censoring and 
midpoint imputation for data set (i) is presented in Table E.7.5.  
 
 
  Part 2  
Distribution (1) (2) (3) 
Exponential 1598.070 1235.738 959.325 
Weibull 1572.971 1194.946 915.244 
Gompertz 1596.229 1221.798 937.968 
Log-logistic 1530.375 1160.217 892.869 
Log-normal 1525.277 1156.591 890.278 
Gamma 1557.557 1178.951 903.286 
Generalized gamma 1490.304 1141.926 886.949 
Inverse Gaussian 1527.450 1157.128 889.196 
Table E.7.1: Model comparisons based on data set (i): Bayesian information criterion 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.683* (0.087)     
Grade 4 1.000 (0.999) 0.993 (0.961)   
Grade 9 0.910 (0.566) 0.929 (0.656) 0.919 (0.571) 
Uni young 1.094 (0.640) 1.067 (0.719) 1.103 (0.564) 
Uni old 1.304 (0.207) 1.284 (0.243) 1.291 (0.216) 
Grade 1 x female 0.898 (0.662)     
Grade 4 x female 0.574*** (0.002) 0.624*** (0.003)   
Grade 6 x female 0.581*** (0.004) 0.598*** (0.005) 0.603*** (0.003) 
Grade 9 x female 0.913 (0.634) 0.946 (0.749) 0.879 (0.446) 
Uni young x female 0.892 (0.537) 0.885 (0.473) 0.911 (0.566) 
Uni old x female 0.808 (0.442) 0.839 (0.477) 0.918 (0.696) 
Mark German   0.998 (0.915) 0.997 (0.900) 
Mark math   1.039* (0.055) 1.036* (0.077) 
Fairness     0.911 (0.380) 
Patience     1.016 (0.405) 
Risk     1.020 (0.315) 
Trust     1.196** (0.031) 
Constant 2.291*** (0.000) 1.757* (0.077) 1.020 (0.968) 
Log pseudolikelihood -679.804 -512.948 -382.160 
Number of moves 1278 1020 792 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.7.2a: Regressions part 2 based on data set (ii) 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.723* (0.064)     
Grade 4 1.014 (0.911) 1.017 (0.890)   
Grade 9 0.776 (0.129) 0.814 (0.229) 0.816 (0.214) 
Uni young 1.203 (0.196) 1.177 (0.241) 1.221 (0.137) 
Uni old 1.255 (0.163) 1.233 (0.201) 1.239 (0.170) 
Grade 1 x female 0.829 (0.322)     
Grade 4 x female 0.627*** (0.000) 0.647*** (0.000)   
Grade 6 x female 0.628*** (0.001) 0.657*** (0.003) 0.654*** (0.002) 
Grade 9 x female 1.136 (0.446) 1.144 (0.404) 1.116 (0.500) 
Uni young x female 0.910 (0.541) 0.900 (0.474) 0.899 (0.467) 
Uni old x female 0.866 (0.493) 0.890 (0.538) 0.967 (0.846) 
Mark German   1.010 (0.586) 1.007 (0.701) 
Mark math   1.024 (0.113) 1.024 (0.116) 
Fairness     0.971 (0.727) 
Patience     1.007 (0.647) 
Risk     1.010 (0.506) 
Trust     1.118* (0.076) 
Constant 2.319*** (0.000) 1.800** (0.017) 1.284 (0.458) 
Log pseudolikelihood -824.6853 -647.334 -510.088 
Number of moves 1720 1423 1150 
Number of individuals 175 144 114 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.7.2b: Regressions part 2 based on data set (iii) 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.690* (0.08)     
Grade 4 1.015 (0.910) 1.018 (0.888)   
Grade 9 0.881 (0.407) 0.918 (0.584) 0.905 (0.495) 
Uni young 1.209 (0.201) 1.181 (0.247) 1.235 (0.120) 
Uni old 1.262 (0.167) 1.236 (0.210) 1.233 (0.183) 
Grade 1 x female 0.863 (0.543)     
Grade 4 x female 0.558*** (0.001) 0.597*** (0.001)   
Grade 6 x female 0.560*** (0.001) 0.604*** (0.004) 0.600*** (0.002) 
Grade 9 x female 0.992 (0.963) 1.018 (0.904) 0.998 (0.988) 
Uni young x female 0.909 (0.542) 0.900 (0.485) 0.891 (0.441) 
Uni old x female 0.863 (0.489) 0.881 (0.508) 0.955 (0.790) 
Mark German   1.007 (0.676) 1.004 (0.829) 
Mark math   1.033** (0.039) 1.033** (0.041) 
Fairness     0.952 (0.562) 
Patience     1.016 (0.354) 
Risk     1.011 (0.497) 
Trust     1.133* (0.055) 
Constant 2.286*** (0.000) 1.631* (0.069) 1.086 (0.815) 
Log pseudolikelihood -805.677 -634.771 -498.523 
Number of moves 1545 1279 1036 
Number of individuals 175 144 114 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.7.2c: Regressions part 2 based on data set (iv) 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.807 (0.119)     
Grade 4 1.044 (0.147) 1.042 (0.133)   
Grade 9 0.831 (0.146) 0.849 (0.152) 0.855 (0.144) 
Uni young 1.094 (0.218) 1.080 (0.189) 1.099 (0.190) 
Uni old 1.339 (0.276) 1.319 (0.269) 1.322 (0.265) 
Grade 1 x female 0.868 (0.109)     
Grade 4 x female 0.612*** (0.084) 0.644*** (0.077)   
Grade 6 x female 0.719* (0.124) 0.743* (0.120) 0.742* (0.125) 
Grade 9 x female 1.237 (0.220) 1.246 (0.223) 1.148 (0.192) 
Uni young x female 0.890 (0.170) 0.893 (0.152) 0.928 (0.155) 
Uni old x female 0.762 (0.228) 0.844 (0.206) 0.912 (0.203) 
Mark German   0.990 (0.021) 0.994 (0.024) 
Mark math   1.027 (0.020) 1.026 (0.021) 
Fairness     0.918 (0.099) 
Patience     1.004 (0.020) 
Risk     1.016 (0.021) 
Trust     1.203** (0.094) 
Constant 2.056*** (0.327) 2.123*** (0.565) 1.222 (0.530) 
Log pseudolikelihood -718.495 -530.684 -397.81 
Number of moves 1,424 1,136 880 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.7.3: Regressions part 2 based on data set (i) - without controlling for uncovering 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.273 (0.273)     
Grade 4 -0.164 (0.212) -0.153 (0.216)   
Grade 9 0.089 (0.267) 0.077 (0.259) 0.084 (0.253) 
Uni young -0.161 (0.289) -0.131 (0.355) -0.203 (0.332) 
Uni old -0.695 (0.451) -0.688 (0.458) -0.779* (0.468) 
Grade 1 x female 0.061 (0.292)     
Grade 4 x female 0.675*** (0.217) 0.621*** (0.204)   
Grade 6 x female 0.533** (0.239) 0.481* (0.249) 0.450* (0.249) 
Grade 9 x female 0.035 (0.301) 0.034 (0.302) 0.121 (0.310) 
Uni young x female 0.143 (0.295) 0.151 (0.351) 0.080 (0.321) 
Uni old x female 0.208 (0.513) 0.253 (0.499) 0.178 (0.502) 
Mark German   -0.005 (0.040) 0.017 (0.036) 
Mark math   -0.022 (0.027) -0.035 (0.037) 
Fairness     0.082 (0.188) 
Patience     -0.024 (0.032) 
Risk     -0.049 (0.040) 
Trust     -0.238* (0.139) 
Constant -3.623*** (0.374) -4.043*** (0.581) -3.234*** (0.819) 
Log pseudolikelihood -685.769 -512.244 -384.229 
Number of moves 1,424 1,136 880 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on the individual level (100 draws) are given in parentheses. Parameters 
are given as log-hazard ratios. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.7.4 Royston-Parmar regressions part 2 based on data set (i) 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 1.450 (0.346)     
Grade 4 0.949 (0.180) 0.979 (0.190)   
Grade 9 1.118 (0.231) 1.112 (0.242) 1.113 (0.230) 
Uni young 0.890 (0.221) 0.929 (0.232) 0.881 (0.225) 
Uni old 0.586 (0.220) 0.592 (0.231) 0.554 (0.223) 
Grade 1 x female 1.060 (0.242)     
Grade 4 x female 1.760*** (0.270) 1.694*** (0.252)   
Grade 6 x female 1.713*** (0.309) 1.713*** (0.338) 1.689*** (0.307) 
Grade 9 x female 1.084 (0.258) 1.082 (0.252) 1.172 (0.275) 
Uni young x female 1.172 (0.278) 1.189 (0.279) 1.117 (0.275) 
Uni old x female 1.145 (0.492) 1.201 (0.510) 1.115 (0.457) 
Mark German   0.995 (0.030) 1.012 (0.034) 
Mark math   0.969 (0.021) 0.961 (0.025) 
Fairness     1.111 (0.165) 
Patience     0.986 (0.025) 
Risk     0.962 (0.028) 
Trust     0.801** (0.082) 
Log pseudolikelihood -3851.606 -2727.388 -1919.758 
Number of moves 1,424 1,136 880 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Parameters are given as hazard 
ratios. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.7.5: Cox proportional hazard regressions with midpoint imputation part 2 based on 
data set (i) 
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Online Appendix E.8: Correctly identified winning positions in total 
We also conduct the regressions on the number of correctly identified winning positions for 
the total number of moves, i.e. for all moves from part 1 and part 2. Table E.8.1 summarizes 
the BIC values that result from different distributional assumptions. It reveals that, again, the 
generalized gamma distribution yields the best fit across the three specifications. The 
regressions based on interval-censoring and the generalized gamma distribution for data set (i) 
are shown in Table E.8.2. 
 
 
  Pooled  
Distribution (1) (2) (3) 
Exponential 3118.191 2452.571 1890.555 
Weibull 3091.543 2401.603 1838.100 
Gompertz 3122.217 2442.509 1873.961 
Log-logistic 3007.852 2335.921 1790.667 
Log-normal 3000.285 2328.224 1784.082 
Gamma 3068.451 2376.750 1817.758 
Generalized gamma 2904.551 2273.014 1749.414 
Inverse Gaussian 3005.460 2329.600 1785.929 
Table E.8.1: Model comparisons based on data set (i): Bayesian information criterion 
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 Survival analysis - dependent variable: correctly identified winning positions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Grade 1 0.750** (0.102)     
Grade 4 0.990 (0.131) 0.971 (0.121)   
Grade 9 0.838 (0.113) 0.830 (0.116) 0.833 (0.111) 
Uni young 1.164 (0.198) 1.122 (0.179) 1.127 (0.182) 
Uni old 1.307 (0.217) 1.266 (0.212) 1.254 (0.206) 
Grade 1 x female 0.845 (0.116)     
Grade 4 x female 0.734** (0.098) 0.752** (0.099)   
Grade 6 x female 0.736** (0.096) 0.753** (0.096) 0.748** (0.095) 
Grade 9 x female 0.906 (0.142) 0.921 (0.143) 0.868 (0.132) 
Uni young x female 0.889 (0.140) 0.889 (0.135) 0.920 (0.135) 
Uni old x female 0.754 (0.156) 0.799 (0.154) 0.847 (0.151) 
Mark German   0.991 (0.017) 0.993 (0.019) 
Mark math   1.027* (0.016) 1.023 (0.016) 
Fairness     0.938 (0.075) 
Patience     1.003 (0.015) 
Risk     1.015 (0.017) 
Trust     1.133* (0.074) 
Part 2 1.199** (0.048) 1.196*** (0.053) 1.212*** (0.062) 
Constant 1.745*** (0.207) 1.642** (0.361) 1.135 (0.400) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1392.904 -1078.755 -811.476 
Number of moves 2,741 2,209 1,701 
Number of individuals 146 116 88 
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are given in parentheses. Coefficients of the accelerated 
failure time model are exponentiated. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table E.8.2: Regressions pooled based on data set (i) 
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
Online Appendix F: Additional figures 
This Appendix graphically presents the share of subjects winning by game length separately 
for the six age groups (see also Figure 4). 
 
Figure F.1: Share of subjects winning by game length – grade 1 
 
 
Figure F.2: Share of subjects winning by game length – grade 4  
 
 
Figure F.3: Share of subjects winning by game length – grade 6 
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Figure F.4: Share of subjects winning by game length – grade 9 
 
 
Figure F.5: Share of subjects winning by game length – uni young 
 
 
Figure F.6: Share of subjects winning by game length – uni old 
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